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ABSTRACT 
 
Heather L. Kaufman 
 
 
COMPETING FRAMES?  THE WAR ON TERROR IN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC 
 
 
 
 
The Iraq War and the War on Terror were pivotal issues in the presidential race 
for the White House in 2004.  Competing frames about the meaning of September 11, 
2001, terrorism, and American power were constructed by the rival candidates and 
established a limited debate that marginalized alternative interpretations of war and 
peace.  It is likely that the dilemma over U.S. forces in Iraq and the War on Terror will 
continue to be a major issue in the upcoming 2008 Presidential Election.  Therefore, the 
campaign speeches of the presidential candidates, President George W. Bush and Senator 
John Kerry, during the 2004 Election regarding terrorism were important to 
understanding the themes that initiated public debate in the U.S. about the conflict in Iraq 
and the War on Terror.  In this document analysis, these candidates’ public addresses 
illustrated how the role of the U.S. power to combat terrorism shaped a particular 
perspective about the post-9/11 world.  Ideas that challenged “official” debate about war 
and national security were excluded from mainstream media coverage of the campaign.  
In order to examine the narrow debate over terrorism and how alternative “ways of 
seeing” war have been and continue to be marginalized, this study compared how the 
candidates framed the war in contrast to anti-war voices.  Cindy Sheehan, who is an 
emergent leader in the peace and social justice movement, and more “official” voices of 
dissent like Representative Dennis Kucinich, have criticized “official” framing of the 
 v 
war.  Dissenting perspectives about the Iraq War and the War on Terror invite a different 
understanding about U.S. hegemony, terrorism, and the consequences of the War on 
Terror for foreign and domestic policies.  The impact of the war upon domestic policy 
and national crises, such as the widely televised and heavily criticized federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina Summer 2005, were examined to explore how domestic crises 
undermine “official” framing of the Iraq War and the War on Terror and empower 
alternative understandings of war and peace.   
Key Words:  competing frames, September 11, 2001, Iraq War, War on Terror, George  
 
W. Bush, John Kerry, hegemony, and the peace and justice movement 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a concerted effort by American 
politicians to connect the Iraq War to the War on Terror.  In the last presidential election, 
the incumbent President George W. Bush and the challenger, Senator John F. Kerry, 
engaged in a spirited, but narrowly limited, debate on American foreign policy and 
homeland security.  As mainstream media ownership becomes more concentrated, there 
is an increasing reliance on “official” sources to define key issues.  Thus, what 
presidential contenders say in an election campaign defines the media’s coverage of 
important issues, such as the War on Terror.  While often disagreeing on other issues, 
President Bush and Senator Kerry employed similar social constructions to defend U.S. 
action following September the 11th.  Senator Kerry argued that the War on Terror 
needed to be conducted with broader global support and significant errors had been made 
when the United States invaded Iraq.  However, he did not challenge the ongoing 
occupation of Iraq or America’s right to use using military force when diplomacy failed 
in order to defend national security.  
Not surprisingly, public perceptions about the Iraq War and the War on Terror 
appear to have been shaped and defined by politicians speaking in overtly “newsworthy” 
contexts, perhaps because of increasing reliance on “official” sources by a concentrated 
and centralized mainstream news media.  The shaping effect of such events and their 
coverage is discernable in the context of the speeches given during the 2004 Presidential 
Election Campaigns.  The candidates’ speeches are studied here in detail, as evidence of 
the manner in which such “official” political speech and media coverage shape popular 
conceptions of war and freedom.  
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Excluded from what the mainstream media defined as acceptable to debate were 
challenges to the idea of waging the war to promote freedom.  John Nichols and Robert 
McChesney are two of the country’s leading media analysts and founders of the national 
media reform group Free Press.  According to McChesney and Nichols (2005), “Some of 
the best professional journalism plays off the controversy in foreign affairs policy debates 
among “official” sources.  But the debates are almost always tactical, i.e., whether an 
invasion of Vietnam or Panama or Iraq would best serve U.S. interests, not whether it is 
moral or legal for the United States to invade those nations” (p. 45).  
Even though Democratic primary challenger Howard Dean ran on an explicitly 
anti-war platform and other Democratic primary candidates such as Dennis Kucinich 
openly challenged the whole premise of the conflict, the corporate media marginalized 
such anti-war perspectives in the fall presidential campaign and beyond.  Dean was 
continually mocked in the media after what he referred to as a “pep-talk” to backers 
following his defeat in Iowa caucuses, began airing around-the-clock on cable news 
programs as the “I-Have-a-Scream speech” (McChesney and Nichols 2005:117).  This 
reproach caused Dean to reluctantly comment, “I fully understand how events could be 
warped by the media,” (McChesney and Nichols 2005:117).  Similarly, the media never 
considered Kucinich a serious competitor for the American candidacy, but a “fringe 
candidate” whose views on the war lay too far outside the mainstream for the political 
punditry of the major news networks to treat him seriously (McChesney and Nichols 
2005). 
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It was only after the war in Iraq dragged on and casualties continued to mount that the 
initial frames1  for viewing the War on Terror were challenged.  An alternative frame of 
the Iraq War and the War on Terror gained widespread media attention only after an 
outraged mother challenged “official” interpretations of the conflict when she lost her son 
to the Iraq War.  This grieving mother, Cindy Sheehan, protested outside President 
Bush’s ranch in late summer of 2004 and began to break the President’s grasp over the 
framing of the Iraq War, which he had portrayed as part of the broader War on Terror to 
convince Americans of the grave threat that Iraq posed.  Alternative frames of war 
oppose the wielding of U.S. military power to enforce democracy abroad and argue that 
war is not a wise investment of American strength.  Advocates of the social justice and 
peace movement argue that the Iraq War and the War on Terror have depleted social 
                                                 
 
 
1 Framing has been described by media theorists, in general, as a way to interpret world events.  Douglas 
Kellner (2005) describes framing as a “contest of representations,” particularly in political races (p. xv).  
For Kellner, following the ideas of Antonio Gramsci (1929-35), the media is just one arena where political 
debate is executed.  The media is located in a vast network of cultural and civic institutions that lie outside 
of the state that provide a “terrain of struggle” for hegemonic groups to achieve their specific goals (Kellner 
2005:xv).  Michael Schudson (2003) describes this process as a “source of distortion” (p. 48).  The “quest 
for objectivity” is derived from the organization of news stories (Schudson 2003:48).  The organization of 
news stories in media broadcasts and print indirectly causes “official” explanations of events to be favored 
over alternative ones (Schudson 2003:54).  Unlike Kellner, who argues that this “quest for objectivity” 
gives those in power direct access to shaping and distorting the news in favor of ruling class ideas, 
Schudson acknowledges that the standards of professional journalism distort events reported by the media, 
but believes that this occurs regardless of media ownership or whose expertise is called upon to provide a 
response to world events. 
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spending on healthcare, education, and other social infrastructure.  In addition to 
dwindling funding for social programs, the movement links the policies that President 
Bush has 
implemented to combat terrorism with curbed civil liberties.  Ultimately, defending 
freedom abroad has limited it at home.   
The “politics of fear” the President employed during the 2004 Campaign went 
unchallenged in the media until Sheehan openly criticized him outside his ranch.  Prior to 
Cindy Sheehan’s disputing the President’s tactics to fight terrorism, alternative frames 
about the War on Terror went virtually unreported in mainstream media.  In addition, the 
widely televised and criticized federal response to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina 
challenged “official” frames about the success of the War on Terror.  The extent of the 
devastation and the lagging response by government officials exposed latent inequalities 
inherent in American capitalism.  Mass mobilizations have helped alternative frames 
concerning social justice and war to gain momentum and to challenge the status quo.  The 
nature of the Iraq War and the War on Terror were challenged when veterans joined with 
Hurricane Katrina survivors and other war resisters in March of 2005 in a broad social 
justice movement to bring soldiers home and hold the Bush administration accountable 
for its policies that have undermined America’s reputation as a moral leader at home and 
abroad.  Most recently, the 2006 Congressional Elections ushered in a Democrat 
majority, which had promised to resolve American involvement in Iraq.  
Because of the clear significance of “official” sources to framing public debate 
about the War on Terror, it is important to examine the range of similarities and 
differences between how President Bush and Senator Kerry initially conceptualized the 
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debate over the war.  From this analysis, we can observe, more clearly, how policy 
positions shape the mainstream media’s response to issues of war and national security.2  
It is important to highlight the impact of the candidates’ basic agreement on the War on 
Terror and its objectives upon the media’s unwillingness to raise critical questions about 
how the candidates perceived freedom and democracy.  New York Times reporter Frank 
Rich (2006) examined the media’s unwillingness to raise critical questions about the 
evidence that President Bush and his administration used to build a case for the Iraq 
War.3  Rich (2006) examined the relationship between his fellow reporter at the paper, 
Judith Miller, and White House officials and found that her over reliance on “official” 
sources prevented Miller from investigating President Bush’s claim that Iraq was a 
terrorist threat.   
Professional standards of journalism limit the range of legitimate news stories by 
relying on “official” sources to debate fundamental issues.  By failing to contextualize the 
facts and events of a story, the press does not connect the actions of those in power to a 
critique of public policy.  By avoiding this critique, mainstream media serve the interests 
of the elite, obfuscating their role as “watchdogs for democracy” (McChesney and 
Nichols 2005).  Beholden to the standards of professional journalism, the media relied on 
                                                 
 
 
2 For an illustration of how the candidates, and how the media and the candidates interacted to shape the 
frames the candidates presented about the Iraq War and the War on Terror see Figure1., Framing Model, 
following Chapter I. 
3 To explore further the relationship between the media and “official” sources, Frank Rich provides an in-
depth critique of the relationship between mainstream media and the Bush Administration in his latest book 
The Greatest Story Every Sold: the Decline and Fall of Truth from 9/11 to Katrina. 
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“official” sources to frame the War on Terror during the presidential campaign and 
abdicated their role as defenders of the public trust (McChesney and Nichols 2005).  
Finally, we can examine how media frames of political rhetoric about war come to be 
undermined and eventually challenged by revelations and events, which questioned the 
veracity of “suggested” “ways of seeing” justice for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001.  
To uncover the frames utilized by President Bush and Senator Kerry in the 2004 
Presidential Campaign debate over the war in Iraq and the War on Terror, I examined the 
candidate’s public statements found on the following public websites:  1.) 
www.whitehouse.gov; 2.) www.georgewbush.com; 3.) www.johnkerry.com; and 4.) 
www.debates.org.  (Since this research began, the candidates’ websites have been 
removed and several of the President’s public statements are no longer available from the 
White House website.  A retrieval source for the candidates’ speeches is located at 
www.presidentialrhetoric.com.  The Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate 
remains available at the aforementioned debate website (see Chapter III and Appendix A, 
Tables A1-A3 for further retrieval information).  The bulk of this master’s thesis is 
devoted to analysis of the candidates’ rhetoric to clarify their positions on Iraq and the 
War on Terror, in order to identify the ideas the candidates used to shape public 
perception.  In the conclusion, I address events subsequent to the campaign, which 
undermined the dominant frameworks for viewing the war and social justice, and suggest 
potential areas for future research.  
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 Constructions of social justice during times of war raised the following broad 
research question.  How did George W. Bush and John F. Kerry frame the Iraq War and  
relate it to the larger War on Terror in their campaign rhetoric? 
Specific Aims 
To examine the social construction of the War on Terror, a comparative case 
study was conducted to determine the themes President George W. Bush, the Republican 
nominee, and John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, used during the 2004 Presidential 
Campaign to frame the debate over foreign policy toward Iraq and the War on Terror.  In 
order to clarify the disputes between these candidates about the way the conflict in Iraq 
and the War on Terror were being conducted, the following is a brief discussion of the 
foreign policy positions that framed “official” debate during the campaign. 
 Ken Kyle, a professor who spent a year at the Korean Yonsei University, had the 
opportunity to examine U.S. foreign policy debate after September the 11th toward North 
Korea.  In the President’s account of the nations that threatened national security not only 
did he designate North Korea as a member nation of the Axis of Evil, but he also 
designated Iran and Iraq.  Although Kyle focuses primarily on U.S. foreign policy toward 
North Korea, Iraq is the only nation of the Axis of Evil, thus far, where foreign policy 
decisions have led to the use of U.S. military force.  In addition, since the candidates 
argued over tactics, not over U.S. involvement in the conflict once the occupation had 
began, Kyle’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy leadership is helpful to our understanding of 
the key differences between the candidates’ policy positions toward Iraq and the War on 
Terror.  
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 According to Kyle, U.S. foreign policymakers take two positions toward North 
Korea, progressive liberalism, typically adopted by Democrats, and national security, 
typically adopted by Republicans (2001).  National security discourse is grounded in the 
assumption that in order for Americans to remain safe in a destabilized world threatened 
with terrorism, “the United States must act as the world’s policeman” (Kyle 2001:248).  
George W. Bush’s rhetoric toward Iraq and the broader War on Terror during the 
campaign was underpinned by national security discourse.  By contrast, John Kerry’s 
rhetoric followed the assumptions of the discourse of progressive liberalism.  Progressive 
liberalism assumes that the U.S. should champion the cause of liberal democracy in the 
world, but not necessarily through armed conflict, but through coalition building with 
other Western nations (Kyle 2001).  Therefore, if other nations only had the opportunity 
to choose market capitalism and the rule of law over other forms of political economic 
governance, they would come to the rational decision of choosing democratic governance 
(Kyle 2001).  The two candidates’ views on the Iraq conflict and the War on Terror fell 
within these two “official” frames of U.S. foreign policy and reflected different policy 
positions that are worthy of a comparative case study.  The debate between the two men, 
however, was limited to the candidates’ foreign policy positions on terrorism, which were 
merely tactical arguments that rationalized American hegemony.  These policy 
approaches marginalized alternative accounts of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the War on 
Terror during the campaign because the candidates viewed their positions as reflective of 
the “natural order” of power.  
 To explore how “official” frames of the War on Terror, and specifically the Iraq 
War, shaped the candidates’ rhetoric, I examined campaign discourse central to the War 
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on Terror by conducting a document analysis of public statements.  I analyzed national 
addresses, campaign rally speeches, and the nomination speeches for these two 
presidential contenders beginning with John Kerry’s acceptance of his party’s nomination 
on July 31, 2004 through November 3, 2004, when George Bush made his acceptance 
speech and John Kerry conceded the election.  
 This allowed me to complete the following research objectives: 
• Describe why terrorism is a threat according to these candidates. 
 
• Identify the role of the U.S. in the global order to combat terrorism, as revealed by 
public presentations of the Iraq War and the War on Terror by these presidential 
candidates.  
 
• Explain how the candidates’ perceptions of U.S. power set narrow margins 
around debate over the War on Terror in the 2004 Presidential Election.  
 
 The campaign debate established that American hegemony was necessary to 
combat terrorism.  The conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror continue to be polarizing 
issues in the United States and throughout much of the world.  The candidates’ rhetoric 
uncovered the initial frames for viewing Iraq and the War on Terror.  These frames 
continue to influence public understanding about the occupation and the threat terrorism 
poses.  
 This allowed me to complete the final research objective: 
 
• Increase sociological understanding of how America’s political leaders use the 
nation’s founding principles to define the role of U.S. power to shape legitimate 
public debate about the War on Terror. 
 
 Studying the presidential candidates’ competing frames and their public 
presentations of the War on Terror allowed me to examine how terrorism is socially 
constructed to present U.S. hegemony as the “natural order.” Thus, the candidates 
assumed that the only means for freeing the world from terrorism was the ideology of 
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American hegemony.  The maintenance of idea that the United States has the power to 
liberate the world from tyranny is based upon its founding principle, freedom, and 
therefore, explains why foreign policy continues to be dominated by the perpetuation of 
U.S. power abroad.  
Significance 
This research is timely and significant for the following reasons.  First, since the 
War on Terror is a recent phenomenon that appears will continue sometime into the 
future, it warrants investigation.  Similar to the Cold War, the War on Terror is ostensibly 
without end.  Throughout this study, I explored how the candidates’ social constructions 
of Iraq and the War on Terror framed the debate about the necessity of U.S. hegemony.  
This is an area bound to become a larger area of study in academia as alternative frames 
to the “official” debate continue to arise in the United States and as nations and as 
ideological groups battle for hegemony over the world stage. 
 Second, this research increases our understanding of the foreign policy 
perspectives that informed the debate between the two major parties in the United States, 
the Republican, and the Democratic Parties, regarding the War on Terror, while 
simultaneously marginalizing the alternatives to waging a War on Terror to suppress 
terrorism. 
Third, this study builds on the existing literature of discourse analysis and case 
studies of George W. Bush and other politically significant individuals.  This research is 
significant because it is a case study of how presidential candidates used the role of  U.S. 
power to frame the debate over the War on Terror in order to not only sway public 
opinion in favor of their strategy, but to advance U.S. hegemony.  Since, these two men 
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represent somewhat different political perspectives, their view of U.S. foreign policy 
toward terrorism varied accordingly.  
Fourth, this study differs from prior research since I will examine the public 
statements of George W. Bush and John Kerry to illuminate not only how political 
philosophies compete to determine the global order, but how these candidates set the 
initial debate over the frames that continue to dominate “official” interpretations of the 
Iraq War and the War on Terror.  Public presentations of war are sociologically 
significant because gaining public consensus and obtaining public support are needed to 
establish the authority to launch war and guide analysis of world events.  This research 
will contribute to political sociology in the tradition of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci 
and will use French social theorist Emile Durkheim’s theory on collective consciousness 
to explain how mass consciousness is informed and shaped by hegemony.  
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Figure 1 – Frame Model 
 
 
 
The Framing Model4 conceptualizes the debate over competing frames about the War on 
Terror and hostilities in Iraq that President Bush and Senator Kerry engaged in during the 
                                                 
 
 
4 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman provide an informative discussion of the effect that the mass media 
has upon the information that is critical to pubic policy in the introduction to their book, Manufacturing 
Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media.  They present a model of the major news media that is 
dominated by the political and corporate elite that seek to limit the range of opinion by marginalizing ideas 
PRESENTING 
AND DEBATING 
COMPETING 
FRAMES 
Mass 
Media 
Mass 
Media 
President 
Bush 
Senator  
Kerry 
SHAPING 
FRAMES 
SHAPING 
FRAMES 
SHAPING 
FRAMES 
SHAPING 
FRAMES 
Senator  
Kerry 
President 
Bush 
 13 
2004 Election Campaign.  The inner part of the diagram illustrates how this study 
examined debate between the President and the Senator without the intervening variable 
of the media.  The outer part of the diagram illustrates the influence that the media and 
the candidates had in shaping the debate over the Iraq War and the War on Terror. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
that challenge "official" sources through the use of “news filters."  The authors argue that the filters the 
elites use to control the news that reaches the public have the five following characteristics: (1) news 
markets are experiencing increasingly concentrated ownership and are oriented toward profit; (2) the 
primary source of income flows from commercial interests; (3) over reliance on government and business 
approved “experts”; (4) “flak”, or threatening and disciplining of journalists who fail to follow the 
industry’s “professional standards” of journalism, which includes presenting both sides of an issue without 
critical analysis; and (5) “anticommunism” to set the parameters of acceptable debate (antiterrorism could 
easily be interchanged with anticommunism, since its function is to question the patriotic impulses of the 
major news media’s reporters.) 
 14 
CHAPTER II  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Previous sociological studies have examined the President’s role during the weeks 
following September 11, 2001 in determining the U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism in 
response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  These studies did 
not examine the debate between presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry 
over Iraq or the War on Terror during the 2004 Election at home and abroad.  Although 
they found that U.S. power is founded upon the moral authority to dictate the global order 
because that nation’s birthright has its basis in freedom, they failed to address that its 
leaders also hold power because they are aligned with potent political and economic 
forces that are central to defining the meaning of freedom.  Although some of these 
studies address foreign policy perspectives that present U.S. hegemony as common sense 
or the “natural ordering” of the world, they do not present a broad discussion of 
American hegemony and its consequences for a critical public debate about the meaning 
of freedom and moral action.  Nevertheless, prior analyses of American power were 
helpful to this research project.  Their analyses of how rhetoric shapes the authority of 
opinion leaders to interpret crises, like 9/11, aided my understanding of how the 
candidates’ speeches facilitated a narrow debate and legitimized U.S. authority and 
leadership in the fight against terrorism.   
Because agreement over U.S. power is consensual, presentations of American 
hegemony on the global stage must be maintained by reproducing a limited debate that 
reinforces the necessity of U.S. leadership to resolve international crises.  The candidates 
presented a limited debate based upon an “official” understanding of foreign policy that 
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presumes America acts in the best interest of freedom.  Missing from this debate were 
alternative “ways of seeing” war.  Chalmers Johnson, a scholar and former military 
consultant to the CIA views the militarized response to 9/11 through the lens of “empire.” 
According to Johnson5 (2004), the social organization of power is based upon a “network 
of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American 
corporations, universities, and communities” (p. 5).  According to Johnson (2006), the 
organization of U.S. hegemony is “kept separate from what passes for everyday life” (p. 
5).  Because a militarized culture has been developed within the infrastructure of 
American society, it is possible for U.S. leaders to convince the public of the need to 
launch wars and to protect American interests abroad without a deep reflection upon the 
morality of imperialism.  Unless elite power becomes undermined by events, such as the 
mounting number of American causalities in Iraq, interpretations of U.S. power that 
counter American foreign policy directives do not gain widespread acceptance.  Although 
alternative frames exist regardless of whether elite hegemony is managed successfully or 
unsuccessfully, they only gain traction when “official” frames fail to produce favorable 
public opinion about U.S. power.  Initially, the candidates’ frames about terrorism 
resonated with the American public as common sense understanding, but gradually these 
frames have become disputed in the mass consciousness as valid goals to safeguarding 
national security and promoting freedom abroad. 
                                                 
 
 
5 Chalmers Johnson provides an insightful understanding of American hegemony in the introduction to his 
book The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. 
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The dual lenses of hegemony (Gramsci 1929-35) and collective consciousness 
(Durkheim 1895) reveal how mass consciousness is maintained, reproduced, and 
challenged in the post 9/11 cultural landscape.  The study of hegemony in the current era 
not only demonstrates how alternative frames challenge beliefs about terrorism; but also 
how they uncover the mechanisms that foreign policy makers have used to maintain and 
reproduce their authority over the interpretation of the ‘long’ War on Terror.  The 
concept of collective consciousness helps to reveal how these frames resonated in mass 
consciousness and how these have been accepted, modified, or rejected by Americans.   
According to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1929-35) who was imprisoned for 
his revolutionary ideas by the fascist government of Mussolini, hegemonic projects are 
the “political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure,” 
through which the ruling class attempts to maintain and reproduce their cultural 
domination over the interpretation of the ideas of that society” (Joseph 2003:52).  
Hegemonic groups, such as the two dominant political parties during the last presidential 
election, are motivated to retain their position of power in the political system and 
therefore seek to define the dimensions of the debate.  However, according to Gramsci, 
the ideas of the ruling elites and their political parties are open to challenge in 
democracies because hegemony is most effective when the ruling class’s ideas are 
willingly accepted by the masses and not forced upon them from above (Joseph 2003).  
Elite political power is limited and can be undermined by structural contradictions.  Ideas 
that initially supported the elite’s ability to dominate the debate can be challenged by 
groups who have crafted a different interpretation of the social and economic conditions 
of a society.  For example, events that proved beyond their control, like the response of 
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the Iraqis to the removal of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent mismanagement of the 
reconstruction of Iraq, can undermine the hegemonic political power of the ruling class 
over the American public.  At such moments, the opposing ideas of other groups, like the 
anti-war movement, have the power not only to influence public opinion, but also to 
shape the foreign policy debate.   
In order to maintain their political power, the elite have attempted to “cure, within 
certain limits,” and to legitimate the political crisis created by the prolonged war in Iraq, 
which many of them had initially authorized with little debate.  In November 2005, U.S. 
Representative Jack Murtha, a decorated Vietnam War veteran who originally supported 
the war in Iraq, started calling for immediate troop withdrawal.  The Washington Post 
reported that Representative Murtha described the war as “a flawed policy wrapped in 
illusion” and warned policy makers of the shift in public sentiment against the war at a 
press conference in Washington on November 17, 2005 (p. A1).  In the 2006 
Congressional Election, this shift was apparent as many members won seats based on 
their opposition to continuing the President’s strategy to fight the Iraq War, as well as 
President Bush’s handling of many domestic concerns and the lack of public 
accountability by the nation’s elected officials.   
Collective consciousness reveals how the “public mind” negotiates the debate 
between hegemonic projects by traditional authorities, such as government “officials” 
and political candidates, and counter-hegemonic projects by alternative forms of 
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authority, such as social justice organizations like CODEPINK6.  The anti-war and social 
justice movement is a counter-hegemonic group of various grassroots organizations that 
question the veracity of military spending, while millions of Americans do not have 
access to appropriate healthcare and education.  The movement argues that if the internal 
infrastructure of the United States continues to be dominated by the military-industrial 
complex7, the nation will fail to function as a republic.8  Leaders like Medea Benjamin9 
have worked with Cindy Sheehan to link military spending for the war to under-funded 
social programs that assist to end poverty, discrimination, and social inequality.  Just as 
Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s successfully linked war to poverty in his opposition 
to the Vietnam conflict, Cindy Sheehan of Gold Star Mothers for Peace has raised 
awareness about the same social justice issues.  She has sought to unite anti-war 
protestors and Katrina survivors in common cause with the help of other organizations 
involved in the United for Peace and Justice Network. 10   
                                                 
 
 
6 CODEPINK works to end the Iraq war and prevent future wars through political protests by drawing 
attention to the lack of resources given to education and healthcare. 
7 For further clarification, see prior discussion about “empire” on pp. 14-15. 
8 For a general discussion about the danger of empire see author and playwright Gore Vidal’s book 
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace.  The author provides a broad overview of the consequences for civil 
liberties and the founding principles that America fights to defend, if the growth of the military-industrial 
complex remains unabated.   
9 Medea Benjamin also works for Global Exchange, an international human rights organization, and is a 
recognized anti-war movement leader. 
10 The demands of the forged alliance culminated between anti-war groups and hurricane survivor’s 
organizations (Veterans for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 
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The emerging social movement is in opposition to many elected officials’ ideas 
about social justice and equality.  At a massive anti-war demonstration organized by 
member groups of the United for Peace and Justice Network for the “Bring Them Home 
Now Tour,”11 a cross-country bus tour, which began at President Bush’s Ranch on 
August 31, 2005, culminating in a march in Washington, D.C. on September 24, 2005, 
Sheehan rallied the movement.  Sheehan declared “We are here today to tell you that we 
are a majority and we will never rest until you bring our young people home from the 
Middle East and until you start putting money into rebuilding our communities:  the ones 
natural disasters destroy with your help, and the ones which your callous and racist war 
economy are decimating.  We won’t allow you to take any more money out of social 
programs to finance Halliburton to rebuild the Gulf States:  there is no money” (2005).   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Military Families Speak Out, Gold Star Families for Peace, Save Ourselves, the People's Hurricane Relief 
Fund, Common Ground Collective, Bayou Liberty Relief, the Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, C3, 
and others) in the “Walkin’ to New Orleans—Veterans and Survivors  
March for Peace and Justice,” in March 2006 were: “1) the immediate return of our troops from Iraq, and a 
call for U.S. tax dollars to be spent on human priorities at home; and 2) the rebuilding of the devastated 
Gulf Coast, under the democratic direction of the residents of the Gulf Coast, instead of the illegal 
occupation of Iraq.” 
11 The “Bring Them Home Now Tour,” was organized Gold Star Families for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against 
the War, Military Families Speak Out, and Veterans For Peace , groups who count veterans and military 
families as part of their membership.  The Tour began on August 31, 2005 from the President’s ranch in 
Crawford, Texas and ended with a rally in Washington D.C. on September 24, 2005 featuring Cindy 
Sheehan, a member of Gold Star Families for Peace.  
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The movement disputes “official” frames about equality and opportunity, the free-
market, and foreign policy.  The social justice movement values equality of conditions 
and not just opportunity, social needs over free enterprise, and a grassroots approach to 
local governance.  On January 28, 2007, groups like CODEPINK, affiliated with United 
for Peace and Justice returned to Washington, D.C. to call for an end of U.S. hostilities in 
Iraq and to pressure the newly elected Democratic Congress to oppose the President’s 
proposals to increase troop deployment and funding for the Iraq War.  The Washington 
Post reported that congressional leaders such as Democratic Representative Dennis J. 
Kucinich of Ohio, as well as Democratic Representatives Maxine Waters and Lynee 
Woolsey of California spoke in opposition to the President’s recent request of Congress 
(2007).  According to the Washington Post (2007), the former Democratic Senate Leader 
Tom Daschle made this remark about the anti-war rally “Its primary value is that it keeps 
up the pressure.  There is a sense that by summer, a march like this will be two or three 
times as large” (p. A1). 
 Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony (1929-35) explain the 
process by which certain ideas, beliefs, and attitudes are transmitted to the public and 
framed Americans’ response to terrorism.  The impact of American hegemony and ideas 
that counter “official” interpretations that shift public opinion illustrate Emile 
Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness (1895).  Since the power of hegemony 
rests in moral action and the collective consciousness is sensitive to moral ambiguity, the 
impact of competing ideas about the “right” use of American power upon the “public 
mind” explains how opposing ideas, beliefs, and attitudes about freedom and democracy 
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develop.  Competing frames about American hegemony engage the “public mind” and 
therefore influence public perceptions of the War on Terror and anti-war sentiment.   
For the purpose of understanding Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness 
and arguing for the synthesis of Gramsci’s and Durkheim’s ideas about mass 
consciousness, I am assuming that Durkheim’s concept is illustrated by public opinion 
polls about the President’s handling of the War on Terror and the Senator’s proposal to 
fight this war more effectively.  Public opinion polls assume that Americans were 
influenced by the candidates’ social construction of the War on Terror; and thus signify 
that the frames employed by the candidates either were maintained in the public 
consciousness or were disputed in the public consciousness.  The Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press (2004) reported that a majority of those polled approved of 
the President during the campaign (56%), while the Senator’s approval rating of those 
polled, was lower (47%) (11 November).  Since hegemonic power is primarily 
consensual, the way the President and the Senator framed U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and 
the War on Terror to combat terrorism had to be reproduced in order for the candidates to 
maintain their authority as presidential hopefuls.   
It is noteworthy that the President’s overall approval rating, which included 
surveying public perceptions of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the President’s handling of 
domestic concerns, declined following the 2004 Election.  According to the Center 
(2004):  “Just half see the military effort in Iraq going very or fairly well, while nearly as 
many (46%) say things are not going well” (December).  Although Americans were 
divided over the President’s decision to invade Iraq, a majority (56%) believed the U.S. 
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should remain committed to stabilizing Iraq (The Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press 2004:20 December).   
Since hegemonic power is consensual, the shift of American’s “collective 
consciousness” since late 2004 has been gradual, as social constructions of war have lost 
their effectiveness when subsequent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, challenged the 
dominant frames that leaders, like the President, reproduced to win re-election.  The 
President’s framing of the War on Terror reproduced and maintained his authority to 
lead.  However, the President’s hold over the debate on the War on Terror in Iraq has 
lessened in the collective consciousness.  The President’s poll numbers signify this shift 
as his approval ratings have continued to decline since the 2004 Election.  On October 
13, 2005 the Center reported that the “…president's overall job approval rating has 
slipped to 38%. And on a number of issues, ranging from the federal budget deficit to 
relations with U.S. allies, majorities or pluralities say that Bush's policies have made 
things worse, not better.”  In addition, in the same report, the Center (2005) stated, “For 
the first time since the war began, a majority of Americans (53%) say the U.S. military 
effort there is not going well. Half of Americans now say the decision to use military 
force in Iraq was wrong, up from 44% last month. Support for keeping U.S. forces in 
Iraq, which had remained stable over the past year, also has declined. As many 
Americans now say the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible as favor 
keeping the troops there until Iraq is stable (48% vs. 47%)” (13 October).  The 
President’s overall approval rating reached its lowest point of thirty-three percent in 
March 2006 (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press).   
 23 
The President’s approval rating has significantly declined since his re-election, as 
his hegemonic power over the social construction of the War on Terror in Iraq has 
become more difficult to reproduce and maintain.  The most recent polling report 
available from the Pew Center (2007) on American involvement in Iraq found that “Fully 
two-thirds of Americans (67%) say things are not going well with the U.S. military effort 
in Iraq, and solid majorities say the U.S. is losing ground in preventing a civil war (68%), 
reducing civilian casualties (66%), and defeating the insurgents militarily (55%)” (15 
February).  
The public response to the dispute between President Bush and Senator Kerry 
over Iraq and the War on Terror during the 2004 Campaign and to subsequent U.S. 
involvement in Iraq can be understood by analyzing the dynamics between “official” 
frames and public opinion.  Both social theorists, Antonio Gramsci and Emile Durkheim, 
provide an analytical starting point to uncover how national debate over terrorism and 
9/11 illustrates that social cohesion is dependent on obtaining public consensus over 
crises that impact society.  However, the two theorists differed on how public attitudes 
influence social cohesion and the maintenance of consensus among members of society.  
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony makes meaning of campaign debate over the War on 
Terror by examining how those in places of power in the political and economic system 
are in a unique position to define America’s response to terrorism.  Specifically, the state 
must present a leader who maintains the supremacy of a social group in two ways.  First, 
the leader must dominate the intellectual and moral debate surrounding the terrorist 
attacks.  Second, for leadership to be successful, the dominant group must be located in 
the “nucleus of economic activity” (Joseph 2006:47-48).  Therefore it “does not 
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[naturally] flow automatically from the economic position of the dominant group…it has 
to be constructed and negotiated…it has to take into account the interests of those groups 
which it is exercised” (Joseph 2006:48).   
The 2004 candidates’ speeches operated like traditional call-to-arms-texts, which 
are used to establish a leader’s authority to dominate the interpretation of events during 
war.  In order to win election to the presidency, the candidates had to persuade the 
American public that voting for them was in the nation’s interest to effectively lead the 
War on Terror.  Call-to-arms texts are intended to establish and maintain power by 
“convincing people, en masse, to kill and die on behalf of some cause or other” (Graham, 
Keenan, and Dowd 2004:200).  At the same time, these texts function to sustain and 
maintain the leader’s power in the social structure during wartime (Graham et al. 2004). 
The candidates’ public statements served to establish their authority to frame events since 
9/11 in order to persuade the public that their leadership was essential to the successful 
culmination of the conflict in Iraq.   
Gramsci (1930-32) argued that groups establish hegemony through the “war of 
positions” by recognizing that in order to win state power, political leaders, such as the 
candidates, must “already play a leading role in civil society and must already be 
culturally, politically and ideologically influential,” before they are in a position to 
establish their political supremacy (Joseph 2006: 53).  This is demonstrated by the survey 
results following the first 2004 Presidential Campaign debate on homeland security and 
foreign policy where Iraq and the War on Terror were the pivotal debate points.  The Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press found in a public opinion poll taken a few 
days after the first debate that the President maintained an approval rating of forty-eight 
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percent over the Senator’s forty-one percent.  According to the Center (2004), although a 
majority of those polled believed that Kerry won this debate, the President’s strategy to 
fight the War on Terror in Iraq remained preferable to Senator’s strategy: 
Voters are divided over whether Bush has made “major misjudgments” on 
Iraq and the war on terror:  47% say he has, while 47% believe he has not. 
And there is a similar split on the question of whether Kerry would give 
America’s allies too much say in U.S. foreign policy decisions: 39% think 
Kerry would give the allies too much say, while slightly more (43%) say 
he would not.  (4 October) 
 
Perhaps the vivid images on and after September the 11th, such as photos of the President 
at Ground Zero with a bullhorn speaking to recovery workers, became etched in the 
collective consciousness.  Thus, Senator Kerry, who “won” the debate on foreign policy 
and homeland security, failed to influence public opinion significantly.  Possibly the 
Senator was unable to shift public opinion more in his favor because the images of the 
President after 9/11 were too strongly burned into the “public mind.”  On the other hand, 
perhaps, Senator Kerry failed to loosen President Bush’s grasp over the debate that 
informed national discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 because he was unable to articulate a 
sufficiently clear position for him to be considered an effective wartime president. 
The President revived this image in his Republican Nomination Speech and 
several late September and mid-October rally speeches.  The following excerpt is from a 
campaign rally on September 20 in New York City: 
I want to tell you, I assure you that I’ll never forget the day that Rudy and 
George and I were in the ruins of the Twin Towers.  It was September the 
14th, 2001.  It’s [sic] a day that – that day might as well have happened 
yesterday as far as I'm concerned.  It is still so vivid in my memory, 
particularly the workers in the hard hats screaming at all of us, particularly 
me, I think [sic], “Whatever it takes.”  That’s what they were yelling at the 
top of their lungs.  We did our best to console people, to hug people, to cry 
with people, to thank people for their work.  A guy looked me right in the 
eye and he said, “Do not let me down.”  (177-183) 
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The campaign rhetoric illustrates how the candidates’ speeches provided both the 
President and the Senator with an opportunity to state their position and engage in a “war 
of positions” (Gramsci 1930-32).  President Bush and Senator Kerry had to negotiate 
consensus with the American public over Iraq and the War on Terror in order to win 
election.  Gramsci’s “war of positions” between hegemonic projects provides 
understanding to what occurred between the candidates as they vied for election to the 
White House (1929-30).  The aims and strategies to combat terrorism and fight the Iraq 
War represent a “war of positions” that occurred between these two candidates.  The 
nature of the U.S. power and the War on Terror was defined by these men as they laid out 
their aims and strategies to defend American lives and freedom from the terrorist threat.  
They presented an interpretation of the War on Terror in Iraq, which reflected an 
America foreign policy debate dominated by “official” views of the conflict.   
Butt, Lukin, and Matthiessen (2004) addressed the construction of discourse that 
legitimizes and endorses a particular social construction of war.  Their study analyzed 
how the President established an ideology that devalued the lives of terrorists, in order to 
gain public consensus and support for the war effort to liberate Iraq.  He demonized 
Saddam Hussein and linked him to Al-Qaeda and the broader War on Terror to legitimize 
the initiation of an attack on Iraq (Butt et al. 2004).  This strategy continued to frame the 
debate over the war during the 2004 campaign.  The President continued to connect 
Saddam Hussein to terrorism, while the Senator searching for a legitimate response to the 
invasion of Iraq attempted to oppose President Bush’s framing of this debate.  Even as 
the Senator refuted the President’s justification for the invasion, the Democratic 
candidate’s strategies to fight terrorism were guided by the foreign policy objectives of 
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the Washington Establishment.  When President Bush responded to 9/11 with the War on 
Terror he created an image of honorable Americans and dishonorable others, including 
Americans who were against pre-emptive war to persuade the public of the immediacy of 
the threat of terrorism (Murphy 2003).  
Coe et al. (2004) examined how the President framed a response to 9/11 to 
establish the authority to dominate the meaning of the attacks.  President Bush used the 
actions of the terrorists on 9/11 as the centralizing concept to provide a foundation from 
which to interpret these events:  for example, good/evil, and security/peril.  Manheim 
(1991, 1994) defined this as strategic political communication (Coe et al. 2004).  The 
erection of binary opposites and strategic political communication are tactics used to 
establish the hegemony of a leader’s moral and ethical leadership.  World leaders employ 
binary discourse with the goal of creating, controlling, distributing, and using mediated 
messages as a political resource (Coe et al. 2004:247).  Anita Lazar and Michelle Lazar 
(2004) examined the War on Terror as a continuation of the rhetoric of the New World 
Order (NWO) that dominated the first President Bush’s and President Clinton’s years in 
office throughout the 1990s.  The rhetoric of the NWO employs binarism to focus on the 
immoral actions of the enemy, while ignoring immoral acts committed by the U.S. in 
order to project America moral authority in the world (Lazar and Lazar 2004). The 
construction of Arabs as enemies justifies organized violence (Merskin 2004) and 
prepares the ground for future violence (Leuder, Marshland, Nekvapil 2004).  This was a 
useful hegemonic device to set the terms of the debate over the U.S. role in the fight 
against terrorism (Lazar and Lazar 2004).  The candidates constructed their opposition to 
terrorism not only to place themselves in moral opposition to terrorists, but also to place 
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themselves in opposition to one another as well.  When they questioned the feasibility of 
their opponent’s strategy to win in Iraq and the War on Terror, they set the margins of 
debate over the tactics used to fight terrorism.  Unlike other potential political leaders 
whose views lay too far outside the mainstream of political thought, these candidates 
were aligned with the Washington Establishment prior to announcing their candidacy.  
Their positions in Washington conferred upon them “insider” status and thus, they were 
in a unique position to shape public debate about these events. 
Their candidacies for the presidency gave both President Bush and Senator Kerry 
unique access to the “public mind.”  This position afforded them the opportunity to 
determine how U.S. hegemony was wielded in the ongoing conflict with Iraq; a position 
that framed “official” debate and marginalized competing frames in the public arena.  
The campaign provided a public space through which these potential leaders of the state 
could display their plan to win the war against terrorism and establish their hegemonic 
position.  As the only two credible contenders for the American presidency, they were 
able to define the terms under which the U.S. possessed the legitimacy to fight a broad 
War on Terror.  In their 2004 campaign speeches, not only did the candidates depict 
American power as essential to combating terrorism, but they portrayed themselves as 
stewards of America’s moral leadership at home and abroad. 
Since presidential campaigns are located in the body of the state and the state is 
the organizing body of hegemony, these two candidates were in a position to “operate 
through a wide terrain,” of civil and cultural institutions located outside the state, 
including the mass media that, according to Gramsci, reproduce state hegemony (Joseph 
2006:46-47).  The candidates had access to conglomerate media outlets and had the 
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opportunity to influence public opinion when they sparred over the presidency in 
nationally televised debates, and when they received frequent news coverage of their 
activities on the campaign trail.  Each was in a unique position to produce hegemony and 
craft a narrow debate about the War on Terror.  Americans could pay close attention to 
not only the President’s and the Senator’s campaign rhetoric, but to the media’s coverage 
of them as well.  Drawing on Gramsci’s model of hegemony, these institutions (the state 
and the mass media) helped the President and the Senator shape what September the 11th 
meant for America’s response to terrorism, the War on Terror and Iraq.   
Durkheim’s theory of collective consciousness explains the process by which the 
candidates influenced public opinion.  Durkheim’s (1895) conceptualization of this 
process uses “social facts” and explains how social constructions, like the War on Terror, 
are introduced into mass consciousness and, if repeatedly encountered on a large scale, 
these eventually shape the collective consciousness to believe in the sanctity of American 
power (Goodwin and Scimecca 2006).  Once the margins of debate were set in the 
context of binary opposites (Coe et al. 2004), such as the relationship between good and 
evil in the post-9/11 world, these became firmly entrenched in the public psyche.  
Although these authors applied this principle to President Bush as he constructed the U.S. 
response to terrorism in the immediate weeks following the attacks, it can be applied 
similarly to both candidates to illustrate how they established the authority to define the 
“official” debate over terrorism in their 2004 bid for the presidency.  They only had to 
refer briefly to their strategies to fight the War on Terror to reinforce their candidacy in 
opposition to terrorism.  For Durkheim (1895) social facts are representations or “ways of 
seeing” that shape our consciousness (Goodwin and Scimecca 2006).  As 24/7 news 
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coverage of Iraq and the War on Terror continued and the election rose to prominence in 
the mainstream media reporting in summer and fall 2004, the candidates were in a unique 
position to set the margins of debate about terrorism.  This provided the two major 
parties’ contenders with the ability to shape the meaning of 9/11 and terrorism to 
influence our “understanding in association with the data we receive[ed] through our 
senses to constitute reality” (Jones 2001:66).  “Shared ways of seeing” were created that 
became central to understanding ourselves in relation to the candidates’ representations 
of ourselves as Americans, as well as understanding our common enemies, terrorists. 
(Jones 2001).  These collective representations formed a shared basis of knowledge about 
terrorism during the 2004 election, which ordered our chaotic post-9/11 world of 
competing visions of patriotism and labeled ideas that lay outside of political party 
definitions as un-patriotic.   
Collective consciousness is ultimately relational for Durkheim (1895).  It is a 
“moral phenomenon” upon which social order and group solidarity is built around 
personal relations that signify “reciprocity of rights and responsibilities” among 
individuals (Jones 2001).  America had found a new mission, making the world safe from 
terrorism, and “a conception of shared reality” (Durkheim 1895) entered into the 
American psyche after September the 11th (Joseph 2001).  Flags were prominently 
displayed in many front yards, prayer vigils were held, and denunciations of the 
hijackers’ actions were pervasive in the public space.  As the 2004 election campaign 
commenced between the major parties’ nominees, the meaning of the 9/11 attacks 
initially crafted and dominated by the President, became challenged by the Senator in a 
narrow debate over the tactics to fight terrorism.  The candidates used the events of 9/11 
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and the War on Terror to place the Iraq War in the context of “past, present, and future 
violence” (Leuder et al. 2004:244).  This debate not only presented narrow interpretations 
of September the 11th, but it also served as a way to gauge the candidates’ fitness to lead 
the country in the war against terrorism.  Questions surrounding the Senator’s service in 
Vietnam and the President’s simultaneous service in the Texas Air Guard, as well as their 
“official” records in public office, became the foundation for examining the legitimacy of 
each man’s claim to having the ability to execute the role of Commander in Chief in a 
time of war.   
Since September the 11th, American political leaders, in general, have used the 
War on Terror to shape the worldview of Americans and consequently to establish U.S. 
hegemony in a global fight against terrorism.  The presidential candidates George W. 
Bush and John Kerry constructed a world in which U.S. power reigned supreme and the 
only alternative to making the world safe from the fear of terrorism was the War on 
Terror.  The only disputed claims between these candidates were whether Saddam 
Hussein had posed a threat to American security prior to the occupation and how to win 
the Iraq War to eliminate the power of militant Islamists and their terrorist organizations.  
The opposition candidate, Senator Kerry, never questioned American hegemony, and 
although he frequently criticized the legitimacy of the initial reasons the President had 
given for invading Iraq, he never questioned the White House’s militarized response to 
terrorism.  Instead, he laid out his own military strategy to end the conflict in Iraq and 
fight the War on Terror, and argued for a broader coalition of nations to fight the war.  
Deciding the role of U.S. power has been inherent to the social construction of this war.  
Therefore, the analysis of the candidates’ rhetoric illustrates how these presidential 
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aspirants not only socially constructed and explained the war and the best strategies to 
fight it in order to legitimize American hegemony at home and abroad; but it also 
provided the initial frames that continue to inform congressional and public debate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The qualitative method document analysis was applied to analyze the campaign 
rhetoric of presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry specifically to 
uncover the candidates framing of the Iraq War and the War on Terror.  This study was 
guided by an interpretivist philosophy of science to explain the process of how the 
meanings of ideas like terrorism are negotiated through social interaction.  In this 
instance, elections were under investigation.  Interpretivism was applied to the 
candidates’ speeches to demonstrate that the candidates sought to influence public 
opinion by making meaning of the U.S. response to the tragic events of September 11, 
2001 and terrorism.  The President and the Senator socially constructed the Iraq War and 
the War on Terror in their public statements that framed public debate.  Interpretivism 
(Esterberg 2002) argues that “humans act toward things based on the meanings those 
things have for them,” and that these meanings, “arise out of social interaction…and…are 
created (and changed) through a process of interpretation” (p. 16).  The 2004 Presidential 
Campaign rhetoric about terrorism was a process of interpretation over America’s role in 
the global fight against this threat that shaped public response to the candidates’ 
competing worldviews.  Simultaneously, this process marginalized dissenting worldviews 
that did not advocate a militarized response to terrorism and questioned the veracity of 
“official” “ways of seeing” the War on Terror.  The candidates were in a unique position 
to create meaning about terrorism because they negotiated their particular explanation of 
the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism with the public in their campaign rhetoric.   
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Document analysis has several advantages over quantitative methods, since it is 
an unobtrusive method.  According to Raymond M. Lee (1992, 1994, 2000, and 2002), 
who has written several methodological books on the use of unobtrusive research 
methods to examine sensitive topics in the social sciences field, document analysis results 
in thick descriptions of social phenomenon and provides the researcher the opportunity to 
study actual behavior in depth.  Since the War on Terror is a highly emotionally charged 
issue, examining political speeches about the threat of terrorism using the texts of 
campaign rhetoric is non-disruptive (Lee 2000) and minimizes the risk of harming human 
subjects.  Since the candidates’ public statements continued to be available on the internet 
after the 2004 Election at presidentialrhetoric.com,12 a project website dedicated to 
archiving presidential speeches, the data for this research is accessible, inexpensive to 
acquire, and easily replicated (Lee 2000).  Document analysis provided an interpretive 
format that was well suited toward understanding how the candidates’ rhetoric shaped the 
debate over America’s response to terrorism.  The campaign speeches of the President 
and the Senator presented an interpretive format to tease out how the candidates not only 
framed the debate over the nation’s response to terrorism, but also the ideas that were 
missing from this debate.  The candidates’ rhetoric not only gave meaning to September 
the 11th, but it also reinforced American hegemony in opposition to militant Islamists. 
                                                 
 
 
12 After an extensive search, this project’s website proved to have the most extensive archive of President 
Bush’s and Senator Kerry’s speeches during the 2004 Campaign.  It is fielded by Paul Stob, at University 
of Wisconsin—Madison and Martin Medhurst at Baylor University, both formerly at Texas A&M.  
Originally, the project was affiliated with the Program in Presidential Rhetoric at Texas A&M. 
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 Drawing on campaign speeches to analyze how the candidates framed the debate 
over terrorism eliminated researcher influence (Lee 2000) upon the subjects and 
presented the data as the speakers intended.  Examining only the President’s and the 
Senator’s public statements preserved the candidates’ social constructions about terrorism 
as they originally presented them during the campaign.  Using an unobtrusive method, 
like document analysis to investigate competing frames about the War on Terror 
increased the credibility of this study’s findings. 
Limitations 
 Although decontextualising (Lee 2000) is one of the limitations of document 
analysis, the candidates’ public statements provided access to how President Bush and 
Senator Kerry framed the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror to define the dimensions 
of U.S. power.  Another limitation of the data was considered.  Professional writers 
drafted these speeches.  The candidates’ public comments may not have absolutely 
reflected their views on terrorism.  However, both the President and the Senator made 
these speeches to present their views to the American public and argue over Iraq and the 
War on Terror in their bid for the White House.  Therefore, the campaign rhetoric was 
attributed to the President and the Senator in this study. 
 The occurrence of “intervening variables” (Lee 2000) was considered.  The 
content of speeches could have changed according to the audience and if the candidates 
shifted their speeches in response to media criticism of their campaign platforms.  This 
could have presented conflicting meanings for social constructions of terrorism.  For 
example, a speech given at a rally for candidates’ known supporters could have included 
commentary on the War on Terror that differs from a speech given to a general national 
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audience.  This would have made making meaningful analyses of the social construction 
of war problematic.  To control for this error, I categorized these speeches according to 
the type of audience to highlight the possible differences in rhetoric and the impact of the 
aforementioned intervening variables.  By placing a document in the context in which it 
was created—by addressing location, audience, and the intended purpose of the 
speaker—this error was minimized.  In addition, it was impossible to know specifically 
the media’s impact upon the candidates’ campaign rhetoric without, for example, 
expanding this study further to track corresponding news reports on campaign issues.  
This was not included in the study due to limitations of time and the need to keep the 
research aims focused.  However, I noted any general trends and any noticeable shifts in 
the President and Senator’s rhetoric to address this possible research error. 
 In addition, because of the “selective recoding” error (Lee 2000), segments of 
public statements that were relevant to this study may have been omitted.  This would 
have resulted in an inaccurate portrayal of how these candidates framed the occupation of 
Iraq and the War on Terror.  However, by triangulating the types of documents I 
gathered, I decreased the chances of excluding important data to this study and decreased 
the weakness that is inherent to “single method reliance” (Lee 2000).  
 Finally, Lee (2000) argues that unobtrusive measures such as document analysis 
have a “limited application range” and are not suitable for all areas of study (p. 8).  They 
are, however, ideally suited to investigations of the public statements of public figures, 
particularly political figures.  Frequently political leaders’ speeches have been studied to 
uncover how their rhetoric shapes the social construction of human knowledge and social 
phenomenon.  For example, prior research has used the public statements of Pope Urban 
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II (1095), Queen Elizabeth I (1588), Adolf Hitler (1938), and George W. Bush (2001) to 
study call-to-arms texts over the last millennium (Graham et al. 2004). 
Sample 
Since I intentionally sampled specific public statements of two presidential 
candidates to reveal their perspectives on the War on Terror and U.S. power within the 
context of the Iraq war, I used a purposive sampling strategy to select public statements 
that reflected their views on the subject (Esterberg 2002).  I selected speeches of the two 
candidates in which they framed and informed the public about the War on Terror from 
the time of the Democratic Convention on July 26, 2004 through November 3, 2004, the 
end of the campaign cycle.  Of the three presidential debates between President Bush and 
Senator Kerry, I chose the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate, nationally 
televised on September 30.  Eight public statements were singled out related to Iraq and 
the War on Terror made by Mr. Bush in his elected office, the presidency.  In addition, 
two public statements by Mr. Kerry were selected on the same criteria, in his elected 
office of Senator.  The following national addresses for both candidates were picked:  
their nomination speeches, President Bush’s acceptance speech, and Senator Kerry’s 
concession speech.  Finally, I chose rally speeches that the candidates made about the 
War on Terror, which included their rhetoric about Iraq (see Appendix A for Tables A1-
A3).  In order to manage the amount of data included in this study a random purposeful 
strategy was devised.  I used a random number table to sample the rally speeches of both 
candidates to halve the original sample of these documents.  Of the President’s forty-five 
rally speeches, I sampled until I reached twenty-two documents and of the Senator’s 
twenty-six rally speeches, thirteen rally speeches were included in the final analysis.  My 
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final sample included fifty documents, including the debate, the candidates national 
speeches, the public statement they gave in their elected capacity at the time of the 
election, and the President’s and the Senator’s rally speeches (see Appendix B for Tables 
B1-B3). 
Design 
 Since document analysis is an unobtrusive measure of qualitative research, it 
lends itself to the study of subjects who are difficult to access directly, such as political 
figures.  In this cross-sectional study of documents, I examined President Bush’s and 
Senator Kerry’s rhetoric regarding Iraq and the War on Terror over slightly three months 
to capture the debate over terrorism between the only major contenders for the White 
House in 2004 to locate the margins of “official” debate. 
Procedures 
  I accessed the candidates’ public statements from the following public websites:  
1.) www.whitehouse.gov; 2.) www.georgewbush.com; 3.) www.johnkerry.com; and 4.) 
www.debates.org.  The first is the “official” White House web site that posts information 
about the current administration and its policies.  The second and third sites were the 
nominees’ web sites where policy and platforms were presented; and the last site 
sponsors and archives presidential debates beginning with the 1988 Debates.  Since the 
documents that were examined are the candidates’ public statements about the War in 
Iraq and the larger War on Terror, I was able to capture a reasonable picture of the debate 
between the only two legitimized competitors during the 2004 Election.  Since the War 
on Terror was a hotly debated issue in the presidential race, both the President’s and the 
Senator’s speeches were easily accessible. 
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Measurement 
 While studying each line of the documents, the speeches were coded to identify 
and define initial themes that shaped the debate over terrorism and provided an 
explanation for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the response to these 
attacks, the War on Terror.  Preliminary research generated the following coding index of 
themes that were grounded in the data:  (1) retelling 9/11, (2) victimizing citizens, (3) 
saving citizens, (4) responding to 9/11, (5) storytelling, (6) hero-making, (7) liberating, 
(8) trusting in the faith and spirit of our nation, (9) proclaiming the future of America, 
(10) defining the President’s role, (11) characterizing U.S. soldiers, (12) characterizing 
our allies, and (13) charactering our enemies (see Appendix C for Table C1).  This 
coding index of themes guided research and exposed more clearly the final themes and 
sub-themes in the data that explained the role of 9/11 in shaping American foreign policy 
toward terrorism.   
 The final themes that guided analyses were organized into categories with 
primary themes and sub-themes and generated a taxonomy of the major ideas the 
candidates used in their rhetoric to frame the debate over terrorism and U.S. foreign 
policy.  According to Raymond E. Lee (2000), who advanced the ideas of Eugene J. 
Webb’s (1966) pioneering work on unobtrusive measures in the social sciences, a 
taxonomy can be generated to measure two dimensions of a characteristic of social 
phenomenon, the characteristic itself and the features of this characteristic.  Measuring 
the characteristic in these two ways identifies and locates it within social processes that 
provide the basis for making inferences about how the characteristic influences social 
processes that construct a particular reality (Lee 2000).   
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 I applied similar measures to the social construction of war by locating various 
themes and their corresponding sub-themes within the President’s and the Senator’s 
rhetoric in this study to illuminate how their public discourse framed the social 
construction of the Iraq War and the War on Terror to explain American power.  As the 
research evolved, the taxonomy of main themes and sub-themes was generated by the 
initial coding index.  The final taxonomy analyzed the candidates’ rhetoric to examine 
their foreign policy objectives in response to terrorism; and how their response shaped 
the perimeters of this debate. The following is the final taxonomy of main themes and 
their sub-themes:  (1) responding to 9/11, (1a) retelling 9/11, (1b) our enemies, (1c) our 
allies, (2) learning lessons from prior wars (2a) arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, (2b) 
arguing over previous wartime presidents, (3) contesting images of patriotism (see 
Chapter IV and Appendix C for Table C2).  Finally, to examine further the perimeters of 
the debate and the marginalization of alternative frames, I looked for what these two 
presidential candidates did not state in their public statements on the campaign trail. 
Validity and Credibility 
   Anton J. Kuzel (1992), a scholar in the medical sociology research field, offers in-
depth instruction on how to increase the validity and credibility of data collected using a 
purposeful sampling strategy in qualitative methods.  As Kuzel (1992) suggests, I looked 
for universal patterns in the data and examined whether the data I collected disputed the 
taxonomy of themes to increase the validity and credibility of my findings.  I verified 
inferences made by a candidate by collecting another statement from the same speech 
category of the candidate to limit error in my analysis.  Negative cases (Kuzel 1992) did 
not dispute prior analysis.  Instead, all of the themes were broadened to capture 
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unexpected cases of both candidates’ rhetoric that made meaning of Iraq, the War on 
Terror, and U.S. power by the debate over freedom and the democratization of Iraq and 
the Middle East.  In addition, the major themes, learning lessons from prior wars and 
contesting images of patriotism were expanded to include Senator Kerry’s rhetoric about 
the impact of the war on America’s social welfare system.  The lack of negative cases to 
dispute the final taxonomy suggests that the interpretation of the debate between the 
candidates is correct.  In fact, the themes that were uncovered were more prevalent than 
expected, especially since the themes were expanded to explain the domestic 
consequences of the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror without losing data that 
explained the dominant frames the candidates used to explain American power.   
   Although I used a single method, document analysis, I triangulated my sources of 
data to increase the comprehensiveness of this method and the likelihood that negative 
cases would be found (Kuzel 1992).  I sampled documents from various types of 
campaign rhetoric.  The triangulated documents included in this study were the 
purposefully randomly sampled political rallies of both candidates, the Foreign Policy 
and Homeland Security Debate, the public statements President Bush and Senator Kerry 
made in their elected capacities as President and Senator, and their national addresses.   
Data Analysis 
  In order to keep track of data amassed during this project I generated a list of the 
final documents for both candidates organized by type, date, and location of the speech 
that were investigated in this study.  I saved segments of public statements copied from 
the above-mentioned web sites as text documents that addressed the Iraq War and the 
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War on Terror in the word processing program, Office 2003.  A content analysis 
computer program, QSR*NUDIST, was used to facilitate analysis of the data.   
  Although I used a purposive sampling strategy to collect my data and, thus, my 
data collection was theory-based, I used a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Stauss 
1967) to guide the analysis of this data.  Using a grounded theory approach led to a 
deeper understanding of how the candidates made meaning of September the 11th and 
how they explained America’s response to terrorism.  In the 1960’s, sociologists Barney 
G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss pioneered grounded theory.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
argued that instead of theory guiding data analysis, data should guide theory instead.  
They reasoned that if the researcher was “grounded” in the data, instead of exclusively in 
theory-building, then making meaning of human reflection, thought, and action would 
steer the social researcher toward a better explanation of social phenomenon.  As I 
immersed myself in data collection and analysis of the data, I discovered themes that 
generated the coding index, and eventually the final taxonomy of themes (Lee 2000).  
This process allowed the dominant themes to be uncovered in the candidates’ rhetoric 
that shaped the debate over the role of the United States in its campaign to fight terrorism 
and simultaneously guided the theory that informed analysis.  Ultimately, this led to an 
explanation of how the candidates’ social constructions of terrorism and American 
hegemony framed the margins of debate and marginalized ideas that conflicted with the 
objectives of foreign policy makers in Washington. 
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CHAPTER IV  
ANALYSIS 
 Three major themes about the nature of U.S. power and freedom characterized the 
candidates’ rhetoric about the War on Terror.  The following are the major themes 
grounded in the candidates’ rhetoric:  (1) responding to 9/11, (2) learning lessons from 
prior wars, and (3) contesting images of patriotism.  The major themes not only guided 
the direction of the research, but also guided theory about how American hegemony in 
the War on Terror is shaped and reproduced.  These major themes in turn helped me to 
uncover and define each of the minor sub-themes.   
Responding to 9/11 was comprised of the following secondary themes:  (a) 
retelling 9/11, (b) our enemies, and (c) our allies.  These themes organized and 
established the perspectives of the candidates about the U.S. foreign policy response to 
terrorism, which shaped public understanding about terrorism.   
The candidates illustrated the lessons of prior wars to connect the War on Terror 
to America’s long tradition of defending freedom.  Learning lessons from prior wars 
conceptualized how the candidates placed the occupation of Iraq and the War on Terror 
in the context of prior wars.  The following two sub-themes were included in this 
category (a) arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, (b) arguing over previous wartime 
presidents.   
The final dimension of campaign rhetoric was the candidates’ presentations of 
patriotism.  Contesting images of patriotism illustrated how the candidates demonstrated 
their moral fortitude to resolve the conflict in Iraq and to lead the nation in the War on 
Terror.  The candidates presented particular meanings about the terrorist attacks on 
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September the 11th and the subsequent War on Terror by drawing upon such American 
ideals as freedom, liberty, democracy, and service to the nation to define the dimensions 
of the debate over patriotism.  In particular, they highlighted the contributions of service 
members engaged in the Iraq War and the War on Terror. 
These themes illustrate how the candidates narrowly defined the debate over 
America’s foreign policy response to terrorism and the conflict in Iraq to the detriment of 
a wider public debate over the causes of and solutions to terrorism.  Largely missing from 
the candidates’ public addresses was a discussion of alternative explanations for the 
events of 9/11 and alternative outcomes for the contest of American supremacy in the 
face of terrorism.  Neither candidate disputed the militarization of the foreign policy 
response to the attacks or the effectiveness of this method to combat terrorism.  Because 
President Bush claimed that former President Clinton could have prevented 9/11 if he had 
not dealt with the World Trade Bombing in 1994 as a criminal investigation, Senator 
Kerry avoided suggesting this as an appropriate response.  Instead, the debate was 
dominated by the idea of waging war when diplomacy failed.  Although Senator Kerry 
questioned the veracity of President Bush’s logic of invading Iraq to fight the War on 
Terror, he did not question that America’s military might and world leadership were 
essential to the global fight against terrorism; or that the United States is entitled by its 
democratic birthright to guide the world in moral action against terrorism.  These 
principles provided the foundation for both of the candidates to argue for the War on 
Terror. 
In addition, the candidates maintained their perspectives on terrorism across 
audience types.  The candidates both practiced message discipline and did not alter their 
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rhetoric on the main arguments they used to convince audiences of their fitness to lead 
the country in the War on Terror.  This was an unexpected finding.  The candidates 
superficially tailored their message to the audience they were addressing (for example, 
whether a speech was given to a group at a university or an organization like the 
American Legion).  However, they emphasized the same points in their rhetoric as they 
would, whether they were giving a rally speech, a national address, or a speech in their 
elected capacity as President and Senator, at the time of the campaign.  In order to 
establish themselves as legitimate candidates for the American presidency, the President 
and the Senator maintained their message across audiences.  The candidates’ practice of 
message discipline reinforced the observation that the debate about terrorism was limited 
because it was informed by American hegemony.  This finding and the following analysis 
of the major themes clarified the manner in which the candidates debated over the 
meaning of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and U.S. power. 
Responding to 9/11 
Responding to 9/11 summarized the candidates’ solutions for preventing another 
direct attack on American soil to confront the dangers of terrorism.  The first dominant 
theme captured the candidates’ perspectives on how the United States should be guided 
by its foreign policy objectives on the global stage in response to September the 11th.  
Although both the President and the Senator agreed Saddam Hussein was a threat, they 
disagreed over whether Saddam Hussein was a terrorist threat and therefore, the 
candidates disagreed over the manner in which the United States should have dealt with 
the Iraqi dictator.  Since the Iraqi leader had knowledge of nuclear weapon technology 
that he could share with terrorists, President Bush argued that the he was a threat to 
 46 
national security.  Therefore, according to the President, since diplomacy had failed, the 
only viable option left was a military intervention in Iraq to remove the dictator from 
power in order to safeguard American freedom at home from terrorists.  Unlike President 
Bush, Senator Kerry did not tie Saddam Hussein to terrorists or the invasion of Iraq to 
protecting America and democracy from terrorism, but instead he connected the outcome 
of the invasion to an increased risk of terrorism for the United States and the world’s 
nations. 
Leading up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, President Bush directly linked 
Saddam Hussein to the Al Qaeda attack on the American mainland. However, during the 
2004 campaign he held that although Saddam Hussein had not conspired directly against 
America with the 9/11 hijackers, Hussein’s relationships with terrorist organizations were 
suspicious.  President Bush’s explanation for the invasion of Iraq focused on the Iraqi 
dictator’s hatred of America and his potential to spread nuclear weapon technology to 
terrorists.  At a rally for the President in New Mexico on October 11, he explained that 
his decision to invade Iraq was guided by his desire to protect America from threats like 
September the 11th from occurring again: 
After September the 11th, America had to assess every potential threat in a 
new light.  It’s one of the lessons of that fateful day.  We confront an even 
greater danger, that the prospect of terrorists getting weapons of mass 
destruction would inflict great harm on America.  We had to take a hard 
look at everyplace where terrorists might get those weapons.  And one 
regime stood out: the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.  We knew his 
record of aggression and support for terror.  We knew he hated America.  
We knew he had weapons of mass destruction.  We know that after 
September the 11th, we must take threats seriously before they fully 
materialize….  So we gave Saddam Hussein a final chance, and he 
continued to deceive the world.  He was deceiving the weapons inspectors.  
And so I have a choice to make at this time in our history: Do I forget the 
lessons of September the 11th and take the word of a madman, or do I take 
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action to defend our country? Given that choice, I will defend America 
every time.  (117-142)  
 
In a speech at a rally on September 20 in New York City President Bush 
explicitly named the terrorists that Saddam Hussein harbored in his country and 
again pointed to the danger the former dictator posed.  According to the President, 
Saddam Hussein could have shared nuclear weapon technology with terrorists like 
Al Qaeda whose attack on September the 11th devastated the nation.  Therefore, 
President Bush argued it was essential for the United States to have removed him 
from power: 
He harbored terrorists.  Abu Nidal was a cold-blooded terrorist killer who 
killed Leon Klinghoffer.  Abu Nidal and his organization was [sic] in Iraq.  
Zarqawi, the person who likes to behead people in order to shake our will, 
is in Baghdad.  He had a network of people in that country.  Saddam 
Hussein paid the families of suicide bombers.  Saddam Hussein possessed 
and used weapons of mass destruction.  He was a threat.  (45-52) 
 
Senator Kerry disputed President Bush’s framing of the Iraq War and that Iraq 
was a growing terrorist threat to the security of Americans.  Instead, the Senator argued 
that the President’s decision to invade Iraq had diverted the United States from fighting 
the War on Terror.  In his speech on the campaign trail to veterans gathered at the 86th 
Annual American Legion Convention on September 1, the Senator argued that due to the 
President’s and his administration’s mismanagement of the War on Terror, terrorism had 
increased and that Iraq had become an epicenter for terrorist activity:   
Violence has spread in Iraq; Iran has expanded its influence; and 
extremism has gained momentum.  President Bush now admits he 
miscalculated in Iraq.  In truth, his miscalculation was ignoring the advice 
that was given to him, including the best advice of America’s own 
military….  I would have relied on American troops in Tora Bora when 
we had Bin Laden in our sights.  I never would have diverted resources so 
quickly from Afghanistan before finishing the job.  I would’ve given the 
inspectors the time they needed to do the job.  I wouldn’t have ignored my 
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senior military advisors.  I would’ve made sure that every soldier put in 
harm’s way had the equipment and body armor they needed.  I would have 
built a strong, broad coalition of our allies around the world.  And, if 
there’s one thing I learned from my service, I would never have gone to 
war without a plan to win the peace.  (38-51) 
  
According to Senator Kerry, the U.S. invasion of Iraq not only derailed the nation from 
its efforts to eliminate Osama bin Laden, but it also put the United States at greater risk to 
the dangers of terrorism.  In addition, although he agreed Saddam Hussein had been a 
threat, Kerry argued during the Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate held in 
Florida on September 30, that the President should have used diplomacy and not military 
force to remove the dictator:  
I wasn’t misleading when I said he was a threat.  Nor was I misleading on 
the day that the president decided to go to war when I said that he had 
made a mistake in not building strong alliances and that I would have 
preferred that he did more diplomacy.  I’ve had one position, one 
consistent position, that Saddam Hussein was a threat.  There was a right 
way to disarm him and a wrong way.  And the president chose the wrong 
way.  (866-870)  
 
Unlike the Senator who believed that Saddam Hussein was a threat who could 
have been defeated diplomatically while the nation dealt with Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda militarily; the President believed that diplomatic options had failed and that the 
only option left was military intervention to prevent the dictator from aiding terrorists.  In 
addition, the President believed that the War in Iraq was a successful military strategy to 
defend the United States and the world from terrorism to prevent another September the 
11th-like attack.  Ultimately, although President Bush and Senator Kerry disagreed over 
the nature of the threat Saddam Hussein posed, both candidates responded to 9/11 by 
connecting the democratization of the Middle East to U.S. security at home and abroad. 
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Retelling 9/11  
 
 Responding to 9/11 was elucidated further by three sub-themes:  retelling 9/11, 
our enemies, and our allies.  Both candidates linked the events of 9/11 either directly or 
indirectly to the War on Terror in their campaign rhetoric.  For example, both commonly 
referred to the loss of life on September the 11th at the World Trade Center with the 
number 3,000 when they described the ensuing war.  However, unlike President Bush, 
Senator Kerry did not connect the devastation of 9/11 to the Iraq War.  Instead, the 
Senator disputed the President’s analysis of the threat that Iraq had posed prior to the 
U.S. led invasion.  Not only did the sub-theme retelling 9/11 capture the candidates’ 
accounts of the events on 9/11, it also introduced the debate that framed the foreign 
policy response to 9/11.   
At an “official” White House ceremony, the President proclaimed Patriot Day on 
September 10 to honor the innocent lives lost in the terrorist attacks on 9/11.  When he 
made his announcement, he reminded us that the greatness of America was displayed in 
the character of its citizens on that day in response to the actions of those who had sought 
to shatter the American psyche.  In the President’s rhetoric, he refers only to the 3,000 
people who died on 9/11 in the WTC as victims.  Instead of examining the reasons that 
could have precipitated this attack, he illustrated how this event symbolized America’s 
invincibility: 
Three years ago, our country was ruthlessly attacked, and more than 3,000 
innocent people lost their lives.  We will always remember the victims: 
sons and daughters, husbands and wives, dads and moms, family 
members, co-workers, and friends.  And we will always be inspired by the 
heroism and decency of our fellow citizens on that day.  Police, 
firefighters, emergency rescue personnel, doctors, nurses, and many others 
risked their own lives to save the lives of their fellow citizens.  They 
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demonstrated the great character and bravery of our Nation, and they 
embody the great spirit of America.  (1-5) 
 
He only once referred to those who perished in the attack on Pentagon.  In Iowa on 
October 25, the President remarked to a group of his supporters only about the damage to 
the building, not the persons who had died.  He did not personalize the lives of the 
victims on the planes or the lives of the workers who died in the Pentagon as he had with 
the victims at the WTC:   
And so their plans became more ambitious, and their attacks became more 
deadly, until, finally, the Twin Towers became Ground Zero, and the 
Pentagon was in flames.  (308) 
 
Neither the Senator, nor the President described the actions of the passengers who 
died on United Flight 93 headed toward the White House as victims of the terrorists.  In 
the President’s televised nomination speech at the Republican National Convention held 
in New York City on September 2, he recounted the events of 9/11.13  The United Flight 
93 passengers were not victims of the terrorists, like those who died in the attacks of the 
WTC; they were saving citizens from being attacked by sacrificing their own lives:  
When I said those words four years ago, none of us could have envisioned 
what these years would bring.  In the heart of this great city, we saw 
tragedy arrive on a quiet morning.  We saw the bravery of rescuers grow 
with danger.  We learned of passengers on a doomed plane who died with 
a courage that frightened their killers.  (4-7) 
                                                 
 
 
13 To explore further how President Bush discussed the events of 9/11 in his campaign rhetoric see 
sentences 29-33 and 140-141 of his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention on 
September 2. 
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When the candidates made meaning of the deaths of the passengers of United Flight 93, 
both the President and the Senator depicted them similarly; they were portrayed as 
saviors and not as victims. 
Three years later at the Third Massachusetts 9/11 Fund Commemoration given on 
September 11, the Senator similarly recalled the events of that day.  The Senator 
presented America’s opposition to terrorism by drawing on the personal experiences and 
histories of the passengers and the rescuers.  When he referred to the attack on the 
Pentagon, he only acknowledged the rescuers at the Pentagon and not the individuals who 
had died.  He used the responses of ordinary citizens to symbolize America’s national 
character.  He described how the United Flight 93 passengers protected the nation’s 
capitol when they attempted to commandeer the plane from the terrorists.  Not only did 
their courage stop Washington from being attacked and inspire them to cooperate with 
one another; their courage inspired all Americans to support one another in a similar 
manner, as was evidenced by the outpouring of public grief following the aftermath of 
9/11:   
Three years ago today, on a bright September morning, a young couple 
took their three year old daughter on her first airplane flight – American  
Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles.  On that morning, a man from a 
tiny town just west of here, reported for work in the World Trade Center.  
He had just gotten a promotion.  He had just married the love of his life.  
And everyone back home was so proud.  On that morning, a gentle priest 
beloved by his parish boarded United Flight 175 to visit his sister in 
California.  One of his parishioners later said he thought God put him on 
that plane to give comfort to those on board.  On September 11, 2001, 
your loved ones and nearly 3,000 others were living out the daily rhythm 
of life in a nation at peace.  And on that morning in a single moment, they 
were lost, and our world changed forever.  In the hours after the attacks, 
we drew strength from firefighters who ran up the stairs and risked their 
lives so that others might live.  From rescuers who rushed into smoke and 
fire at the Pentagon.  From the men and women of Flight 93 who 
sacrificed themselves to save our nation’s Capitol. They didn’t think 
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twice.  They didn’t look back.  And their courage lifted our nation.  On 
that day, we all drew strength from each other….  So while September 
11th was the worst day we have ever seen, it brought out the best in all of 
us. We will always remember where we were on that day.  And we must 
always remember that we will only defeat those who sought to destroy us 
by standing together as one America.  (3-30) 
 
Like President Bush, Senator Kerry depersonalized the terrorists by focusing on their 
actions rather than reflecting on U.S. power.  By failing to acknowledge that American 
intervention abroad was not always welcomed, the candidates were able to avoid 
addressing whether Al-Qaeda had intelligible reason(s) for attacking the nation and 
therefore, the President and the Senator set the margins of debate over U.S. foreign policy 
within narrow constraints.14  Both candidates employed images that aligned the actions of 
ordinary citizens with government foreign policy to set the margins of the debate over the 
meaning of the attacks.  In order to illustrate the conflict between the United States and 
the terrorists to establish America’s moral superiority, both candidates made meaning of 
the bravery of Americans and the sacrifices citizens had made for one another.  As a 
result, a rigorous evaluation of the American foreign policy in the Middle East over the 
last several decades was absent. 
Our Enemies 
 
 By describing who was responsible for 9/11 and who was a continued threat to 
national security, this theme clarified the candidates’ foreign policy positions and the 
direction they would take the country to fight terrorism.  In President Bush’s address at 
                                                 
 
 
14 To further examine how Senator Kerry treated the events of 9/11 in his campaign rhetoric see sentences 
14-20 of his speech at the Massachusetts 9/11 Memorial Fund and his September the 11th Democratic 
National Radio Address, lines 6-11. 
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the Republican National Convention in New York City, he stated his position on fighting 
terrorism.  Since the enemy feared freedom, he illustrated how advancing freedom in the 
Middle East was essential to defeating the terrorists.  It was essential to democratize Iraq 
in order to disavow the power of radical Islam and protect liberty: 
Others understand the historic importance of our work.  The terrorists 
know.  They know that a vibrant, successful democracy at the heart of the 
Middle East will discredit their radical ideology of hate.  They know that 
men and women with hope, and purpose, and dignity do not strap bombs 
on their bodies and kill the innocent.  The terrorists are fighting freedom 
with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear 
and they should be afraid, because freedom is on the march.  (100-104) 
 
Not only did the President elaborate on the brutality of terrorists, he emphasized the 
viciousness of Saddam Hussein, whom he had continually associated with Al Qaeda 
throughout his campaign rhetoric.  In his speech to a crowd in Ohio on October 22, he 
shared an account about the pettiness of the dictator:  
One of the most poignant stories of my presidency was when the Oval 
Office door opened and in came seven men from Iraq, all of whom had 
had their right hand cut off by Saddam Hussein because the currency of 
that country had devalued and he needed scapegoats.  It’s a true story, I’m 
telling you.  And I asked one of the men there.  I said, why you?  He said 
he was a small merchant who needed gold to make jewelry, and he sold 
dinars to buy another currency so he could buy the gold, and it just 
happened to be on the day that Saddam was looking for a scapegoat.  He 
found seven small merchants, seven individuals, [sic] hauled in, Xs  
carved in their foreheads, and their right hands cut off.  (72-77) 
 
The demonization of Saddam Hussein was common throughout the President’s 
campaign.  When he elaborated on the threat that organizations and individuals linked to 
terrorism posed to democracy, he always defended his actions by relating the horrific 
dehumanization of Iraq’s citizens under Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical rule.   
The Senator made comparable references to the enemy.  Like the President, he did 
not question whether the United States should isolate radical Islamists and liberate the 
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Middle East from their influence.  Instead, the Senator disputed the validity of the 
President’s claim that Saddam Hussein was a terrorist threat, but shared the President’s 
perspective about the ruthlessness that had characterized Saddam Hussein’s rule over 
Iraq.  At Temple University on September 24, the Senator compared the current conflict 
with terrorism to the threat Communism posed to freedom during the Cold War and 
demonstrated the difference between freedom’s enemies:  
I begin with this belief:  The war on terror is as monumental a struggle as 
the Cold War.  Its outcome will determine whether we and our children 
live in freedom or in fear.  It is not, as some people think, a clash of 
civilizations.  Radical Islamic fundamentalism is not the true face of 
Islam.  This is a clash between civilization and the enemies of civilization; 
between humanity’s best hopes and most primitive fears….  The invasion 
of Iraq was a profound diversion from the battle against our greatest 
enemy – Al Qaeda – which killed more than three thousand people on 
9/11 and which still plots our destruction today.  Iraq is now what it was 
not before the war – a haven for terrorists.  George Bush made Saddam 
Hussein the priority.  I would have made Osama bin Laden the priority.  
As president, I will finish the job in Iraq and refocus our energies on the 
real war on terror.  (43-70)   
 
Senator Kerry ranked Al Qaeda as the greatest enemy that the United States faced.  Like 
the former Communist U.S.S.R., Al Qaeda had the ability and the tenacity to destroy 
America.  For the Senator, Osama bin Laden was the furthermost danger to America and 
democracy, not Saddam Hussein.  Both of the candidates compared past U.S. enemies to 
Al Qaeda.  Like the Communists, the terrorists were relentless in their crusade to spread 
their ideology throughout the Middle East in order to usurp the West’s power and 
influence over the world.  In the candidates’ rhetoric, like the Cold War, the War on 
Terror was an epic battle that would decide the future of freedom.  
Our Allies 
 
Since for both candidates the War on Terror was a war that must be won, one of 
the major strategies that would predict a successful outcome for the United States was the 
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way in which America handled its alliances with foreign countries.  Following the 
Foreign Policy and Homeland Security Debate on September 30, the President addressed 
the Senator’s criticism of his alliance building to fight the War on Terror in Iraq.  
President Bush defended his record of diplomatic leadership and the nations that 
supported America’s global fight against terror abroad to supporters in Iowa on October 
25: 
We have stated clearly the challenge to civilization, and we have rallied 
many nations to oppose it.  More than 90 nations are actively engaged in 
the war on terror.  All 26 NATO nations have personnel in either Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or both.  NATO has taken leadership of an international 
force in Afghanistan, the first out-of-area deployment in the history of our 
alliance.  Japan has deployed forces to Iraq, the first overseas mission in 
the history of their democracy.  Forces from South Korea are in Iraq, as 
well.  America has led, many have joined, and America and the world are 
safer.  My opponent takes a different approach.  He believes that instead 
of leading with confidence, America must submit to what he calls a global 
test.  I’m not making that up.  He was standing right about just [sic] there 
when I heard him say it.  As far as I can tell – as far as I can tell, that 
means our country must get permission from foreign capitals before we 
act in our own self-defense.  As President, I will always work with other 
countries and seek their advice.  But there is a world of difference between 
working with good allies and giving a few reluctant nations veto power 
over our role in the world.  I will never submit our national security 
decisions to the veto of a foreign government.  (89-103) 
 
President Bush questioned Senator Kerry’s ability to protect America from the continued 
threat of terrorism using the Senator’s concept of the “global test.”  He questioned the 
legitimacy of the Senator’s foreign policy position of building alliances.  The President 
disputed whether the Senator, if elected President, would prioritize the national security 
needs of the United States over global interests.   
During the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate in Florida on 
September 30, Jim Lehrer, the moderator, asked Senator Kerry what his position was on 
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pre-emptive war.  The Senator replied and defended the “global test” against the 
President’s criticism that was ongoing throughout the campaign:   
The president always has the right, and always has had the right, [sic] for 
pre-emptive strike.  That was a great doctrine throughout the Cold War.  
And it was always one of the things we argued about with respect to arms 
control.  No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded, 
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the 
United States of America.  But if and when you do it, Jim, you have to do 
it in a way that passes the test, that passes the global test where your 
countrymen, your people understand fully why you're doing what you're 
doing and you can prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.  
(771-775)  
 
The Senator did not argue over the right of the President of the United States to execute a 
pre-emptive strike against any nation or organization that threatens the national security 
of the United States.  The Senator diverged from the President on how the United States 
should proceed to execute a pre-emptive strike.  He questioned the veracity of the claims 
the administration made at the U.N. about the threat Iraq posed and the rest of the nations 
the U.S. claimed as its allies in the War on Terror.  Senator Kerry’s strategy of 
performing a global test prior to military intervention was a thinly veiled criticism against 
President Bush’s and his administration’s procedural tactics leading to the invasion of 
Iraq.  
Learning Lessons from Prior Wars 
 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 that struck the World Trade Center, 
the Pentagon, and the hijacked plane that never hit its intended target—Washington, D.C. 
— marked a defining moment in U.S. history.  The shock that these violent acts delivered 
to the heart of the nation was reflected in the campaign rhetoric of President Bush and 
Senator Kerry when they compared the War on Terror to other wars the nation had 
fought.  The candidates compared prior wars to the present War on Terror to emphasize 
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America’s long tradition of leadership in foreign affairs and the nation’s effectiveness at 
combating threats to freedom.   
Learning lessons from prior wars examined how the candidates used the historical 
role of U.S. military might in world affairs to explain their interpretation of the America’s 
response to terrorism.  In particular, they compared 9/11 to other extraordinary events in 
the nation’s history, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; and they 
compared America’s response then, WWII, to America’s response now, the War on 
Terror.   
At one of the President’s rally speeches on October 11 in New Mexico, he 
outlined the similarities between WWII and the liberation of Iraq from terrorism.  In 
order to predict the outcome of the War on Terror and the future of American power 
abroad, he linked America’s past WWII conflict with the Japanese to the present conflict 
with Iraq:  
I believe in the transformational power of liberty…..  You see, it wasn't all 
that long ago that we were fighting the Japanese….  And after we won, 
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, believed in the power of 
liberty to transform societies.  And he worked with the Japanese to help 
them develop a democracy….  There was a lot of pessimism after World 
War II….  The Japanese were the enemy….  We had defeated them.  A lot 
of people here’s [sic] lives had been turned upside-down because a loved-
one’s life had been lost, and they didn’t have – [sic] want to have anything 
to do with the enemy.  But fortunately, there were people in this country 
who had the faith in the ability of liberty to transform societies.  And so 
now I sit down at the table with Prime Minister Koizumi talking about the 
peace, talking about how to achieve the peace we want for our children 
and grandchildren.  I believe the same lessons apply for today.  We will 
achieve a free Iraq.  Iraq will be a democracy.  And when we do so, at 
some point in time, an American President and a duly-elected leader of 
Iraq will be sitting down talking about how to keep the peace.  And our 
children and grandchildren will be able to live in a better world.  (171-
193)  
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According to the President, just as the Japanese had became our allies at the end 
of WWII, once the Iraqis embraced democracy, they also would become our allies in the 
War on Terror.  Although the Senator compared the scope of the new war America was 
undertaking to WWII, he chose other elements than the President did to illustrate 
America’s ability to advance liberty.  According to Senator Kerry, President Bush’s 
mishandling of the conflict in Iraq had damaged America’s reputation.  The Senator 
advanced the lessons of WWII to demonstrate the need to not only restore America’s 
reputation, but to push the nation toward the vanguard of innovation.  He compared his 
strategy to fight the War on Terror to the domestic and foreign policies of WWII that had 
elevated America’s reputation15 and had brought technological advances that raised the 
living standards of its citizens.  Senator Kerry addressed the tradition of American 
innovation and progress that had occurred during WWII to a crowded rally in New 
Mexico on October 11.  He illustrated that the Iraq War was not similarly leading to 
advancements in energy development; but instead exemplified the perils of continued 
U.S. foreign oil dependency:  
In the summer of 1942, with the scars of Pearl Harbor still fresh,   
Americans were gearing up for battle.  Yes, planes and tanks had to be 
built at a record pace, strategies conceived, battles planned, and young 
Americans dispatched to frontlines around the globe.  But Franklin 
Roosevelt knew that we needed something more.  He knew we had to 
marshal America's most brilliant minds and best technology….  When 
they went to war, this Administration’s energy experts projected that oil 
would be as low as $28 a barrel today.  Last week, gas prices hit a record 
$53 a barrel - and one big reason is because of this president's gross 
mismanagement of the war in Iraq.  As president, I have a real energy plan 
                                                 
 
 
15 See his nomination speech at the Democratic Convention, sentences 19-28, for an illustration of 
America’s moral stewardship of freedom after WWII in West and East Germany. 
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to harness the full force of America’s technology and make this nation 
independent of Middle East oil in ten years….  I want an America that 
relies on its own ingenuity and innovation, not the Saudi Royal family.  So 
much promise stretches before us.  America needs to climb the next 
mountain, look to the next horizon, and ask: What if?  For the sake of our 
children…for the sake of our security … for the sake of our economy … 
for the sake of our environment … we must meet that challenge and make 
America energy independent of Mideast oil.  (6-29)  
 
The President’s war policy in Iraq symbolized the failed domestic and foreign policies for 
the Senator.  Unlike WWII, the Iraq War and the War on Terror did not lead to the 
development of new technology nor expand the labor market.   
The major theme, learning lessons from prior wars, captured the candidates’ 
differing interpretations of WWII.  The candidates contrasted their foreign policy 
objectives to fight terrorism with one another by disputing the goals and outcomes of 
WWII.  The President emphasized the success with which Truman had democratized 
Japan in order make peace with a former enemy. Similarly, he believed Iraq needed to 
become a democracy in order to prevent global terrorism and stabilize the Middle East.  
The Senator did not draw this analogy between this past war and the current War on 
Terror.  Instead, he used it as an object lesson to demonstrate the failings of the 
President’s strategy to fight the War on Terror.  Unlike the War on Terror, WWII had 
raised America in the eyes of the global community to become a moral leader and had 
advanced technology for the betterment of the nation.   
Arguing Over the Vietnam Syndrome 
 
The candidates argued about the success of the President’s strategy to 
democratize Iraq.  The President’s foreign policy mandated that before the troops 
returned home Iraq must assume responsibility for the protection of its fledging 
democracy from terrorists and by default defend democracy for the United States and 
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Israel as well.  Many of the President’s arguments eerily echoed those of his Texas 
predecessor in the White House, Lyndon Baines Johnson, as he had struggled in vain to 
convince Americans that U.S. troop involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1960s was vital 
to defeating Communism and was the will of the South Vietnamese people.  The 
President argued America would be safe from the threat of terrorism only when Iraqis 
became allies of America and freedom.  In the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy 
Debate, the President outlined his plan for victory in Iraq when he responded to Jim 
Lehrer’s question about establishing a timeline for troop deployment from Iraq: 
We’ll never succeed in Iraq if the Iraqi citizens do not want to take matters 
into their own hands to protect themselves.  I believe they want to.  Prime 
Minister Allawi believes they want to.  And so the best indication about 
when we can bring our troops home – which I really want to do, but I 
don’t want to do so for the sake of bringing them home; I want to do so 
because we’ve achieved an objective – [sic] is to see the Iraqis perform 
and to see the Iraqis step up and take responsibility….  A free Iraq will be 
an ally in the war on terror, and that’s [sic] essential.  A free Iraq will set a 
powerful example in the part of the world that is desperate for freedom.  A 
free Iraq will help secure Israel.  A free Iraq will enforce the hopes and 
aspirations of the reformers in places like Iran.  A free Iraq is essential for 
the security of this country.  (286-303)  
 
Instead of agreeing with the President, the Senator viewed the military conflict in Iraq as 
not only a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror, but as an unnecessary war in which a 
failing policy was risking American lives.  He saw the President’s policy of liberation 
resulting in an occupation of a country whose residents bitterly resented the presence of 
the U.S. military, just as he had witnessed in Vietnam as a young soldier.  Many 
Vietnamese blamed the Americans for the conflict ravaging their nation. 
Due to President Bush’s lack of diplomacy and overwhelming reliance on military 
force to liberate the Iraqi people, Senator Kerry perceived the administration’s policy as 
an unsuccessful attempt at nation building that risked the safety of American soldiers and 
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their morale.16  Earlier in the debate, Jim Lehrer had asked the Senator what 
misjudgments he thought the President had made in Iraq.  In response, Senator Kerry 
questioned the veracity of President Bush’s claim that Iraq was the central to the War on 
Terror and thus necessitated military force: 
Well, where do you want me to begin?  First of all, he made the 
misjudgment of saying to America that he was going to build a true 
alliance, that he would exhaust the remedies of the United Nations and go 
through the inspections…..  He also promised America that he would go to 
war as a last resort.  Those words mean something to me, as somebody 
who has been in combat.  “Last resort.”  You've got to be able to look in 
the eyes of families and say to those parents, “I tried to do everything in 
my power to prevent the loss of your son and daughter.”  I don't believe 
the United States did that.  And we pushed our allies aside.  And so, today, 
we are 90 percent of the casualties and 90 percent of the cost: $200 billion 
– $200 billion that could have been used for health care, for schools, for 
construction, for prescription drugs for seniors, and it's in Iraq.  And Iraq 
is not even the center of the focus of the war on terror.  The center is 
Afghanistan, where, incidentally, there were more Americans killed last 
year than the year before…where the elections have been postponed three 
times.  (105-119)  
 
Senator Kerry drew on his own experience as a soldier in Vietnam to explain that he 
viewed President Bush’s failure to go to war as a “last resort,” as the ultimate error of the 
President’s foreign policy on terrorism.  The Senator believed that the breakdown of 
diplomacy between the United States and the U.N. and the failure of the President to 
work more extensively with U.S. allies had caused the President to act injudiciously and 
ask for the ultimate sacrifice of American military families, their children.  In addition, 
the Senator argued that the President was diverting resources away from Afghanistan at 
                                                 
 
 
16 To further examine the Senator’s position on the Iraq War and troop support see sentences 307-325 of the 
Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate. 
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not only the cost of U.S. service people’s lives in Iraq, but to the fiscal detriment of the 
next generation and the elderly.   
 In his response to Senator Kerry’s assessment, President Bush pointed out that the 
Senator had access to the same foreign intelligence about Saddam Hussein’s ability to 
produce nuclear weapons, and the Senator had come to the same conclusion as the 
President had when he voted with Congress to authorize the President to use force in Iraq.  
In addition, the President stated that his decision to invade Iraq was supported by the 
United Nations.17  The President further explained that terrorism had spread beyond the 
borders of Afghanistan and it was essential to have the presence of a U.S. military 
operation in Iraq to fight the war effectively:  
But to say that there's only one focus on the war on terror doesn't really 
understand the nature of the war on terror.  Of course we're after Saddam 
Hussein – I mean bin Laden. He’s isolated.  Seventy-five percent of his 
people have been brought to justice.  The killer – the mastermind of the 
September 11th attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, is in prison.  We’re 
making progress.  But the front on this war is more than just one place….  
(155-161)   
 
However, Senator Kerry had since shifted his interpretation of the War on Terror.  When 
it was revealed that Iraq was not a nuclear threat prior to the invasion, he pointed out that 
not only was the President’s plan to go to war with Iraq ill conceived, but the President 
had also failed to prepare service members for their duties in the conflict:  
The president just talked about Iraq as a center of the war on terror. Iraq 
was not even close to the center of the war on terror before the president 
invaded it….  You don't take America to war unless [sic] have the plan to 
win the peace.  You don’t send troops to war without the body armor that 
they need.  I’ve met kids in Ohio, parents in Wisconsin places, Iowa, 
where they’re going out on the Internet to get the state-of-the-art body 
gear to send to their kids.  Some of them got them for a birthday present.  I 
                                                 
 
 
17 See sentences 124-146 of the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy Debate for this discussion.  
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think that’s wrong. Humvees – 10,000 out of 12,000 Humvees that are 
over there aren’t armored.  And you go visit some of those kids in the 
hospitals today who were maimed because they don’t have the armament.  
This president just – I don’t  know if he sees what’s really happening over 
there.  But it's getting worse by the day.  More soldiers killed in June than 
before.  More in July than June.  More in August than July.  More in 
September than in August.  (181-197) 
 
The President responded to the Senator’s claim that he took the nation to war 
without a plan to secure Iraq by questioning the Senator’s ability to unite the troops in 
victory when he initially had been ambivalent about funding the mission in Iraq.  The 
President’s arguments revived charges of die-hard supporters of the U.S. military 
involvement in Vietnam that Congress’s wavering support had demoralized the American 
troops and had hamstrung their efforts to win that conflict.18  President Bush stated:  
My opponent says help is on the way, but what kind of message does it 
say to our troops in harm’s way, “wrong war, wrong place, wrong time?”  
Not a message a commander in chief gives, or this is a “great diversion.”  
As well, help is on the way, but it’s certainly hard to tell it when he voted 
against the $87-billion supplemental to provide equipment for our troops, 
and then said he actually did vote for it before he voted against it.  Not 
what a commander in chief does when you’re [sic] trying to lead troops.  
(332-335) 
 
Senator Kerry responded to President Bush‘s criticism by reminding the audience that he 
was standing up for what was right, just as he did when he came back for Vietnam.  
Unlike President Johnson who ultimately resigned because of the failure of U.S. 
leadership to stabilize Vietnam, the Senator argued that an effective leader needed to 
                                                 
 
 
18 See Joseph Fry’s discussion in Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings and 
Terry Dietz’s analysis in Republicans and Vietnam, 1961-1968 for an in-depth examination of the debate 
over U.S. funding and troop morale during the Vietnam War. 
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admit and correct mistakes in order to provide a response that was sufficient to combat 
terrorism: 
Well, you know, when I talked about the $87 billion, I made a 
mistake in how I talk about the war.  But the president made a 
mistake in invading Iraq.  Which is worse?  I believe that when 
you know something’s going wrong, you make it right.  That’s 
what I learned in Vietnam.  When I came back from that war I saw 
that it was wrong.  Some people don’t like the fact that I stood up 
to say no, but I did.  And that’s what I did with that vote.  And I’m 
going to lead those troops to victory.  (336-344) 
 
Jim Lehrer then asked Senator Kerry about his testimony in 1971 at a congressional 
investigation of the Vietnam War.  He quoted the Senator who had said in 1971:  “How 
do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?” He then asked if, 
“…Americans [are] now dying in Iraq for a mistake?”  As he analyzed the decisions that 
led to a war in Iraq, the Senator responded that the lessons he had learned from fighting 
in Vietnam made him a cautious leader, who would not go to war unless it was absolutely 
necessary:   
No, and they don’t have to, providing we have the leadership that we put – 
that I’m offering [sic].  I believe that we have to win this.  The president 
and I have always agreed on that.  And from the beginning, I did vote to 
give the authority, because I thought Saddam Hussein was a threat, and I 
did accept that intelligence.  But I also laid out a very strict series of things 
we needed to do in order to proceed from a position of strength.  Then the 
president, in fact, promised them….he said, “We will plan carefully.  We 
will proceed cautiously.  We will not make war inevitable.  We will go 
with our allies.” He didn’t do any of those things.  They didn’t do the 
planning.  They left the planning of the State Department in the State 
Department desks.  They avoided even the advice of their own general.  
General Shinsheki, the Army chief of staff, said you’re going to need 
several hundred thousand troops.  Instead of listening to him, they retired 
him….  And what we need now is a president who understands how to 
bring these other countries together to recognize their stakes in this.  (349-
366) 
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The President retorted that the Senator lacked the credibility to lead our allies if he 
believed that the Iraq War was a “grand diversion.”  The Senator had equivocated too 
often on his decision to provide funding for the conflict to make his arguments credible 
and thus the Senator lacked the ability to strengthen our alliances and engage the respect 
of world leaders and forces on the ground: 
You can’t [sic] expect to build an alliance when you denigrate the 
contributions of those who are serving side by side with American troops 
in Iraq.  Plus, he says the cornerstone of his plan to succeed in Iraq is to 
call upon nations to serve.  So what’s the message going to be: “Please 
join us in Iraq.  We’re a grand diversion.  Join us for a war that is the 
wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time?”  (386-390) 
  
The major disagreement about the strategy to fight the War on Terror between the 
two candidates revolved around whether fighting the Iraq War was essential to the War 
on Terror or whether the Iraq War was a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror.  From 
this disagreement over the Iraq War stemmed all other differences of opinion between the 
candidates. The President viewed the Iraq War as a path to defending democracy from 
terrorism and a way to avoid another direct hit on American soil.  The Senator viewed the 
conflict as an increasing threat to the stability of the Middle East and American foreign 
policy, as well as a threat to domestic policy.  He argued that due to the President’s 
strategy to fight the War on Terror, the democratization of Iraq was impossible if the 
Iraqis viewed U.S. forces as occupiers. President Bush viewed his steadfastness in 
pursuing victory in Iraq as essential to refuting the charge that Vietnam had proven that 
the United States could be defeated if their enemy could drag out the conflict until the 
American public’s will flagged.  In contrast, Kerry argued that Vietnam should have 
taught the nation’s foreign policy leaders to choose their battlefields more wisely and 
avoid ideologically ambiguous commitments of American military strength.  
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Arguing Over Previous Wartime Presidents 
 
The President compared the Senator to past Presidents from the Democratic Party 
and the Republican Party to dismiss his opponent’s policies.  The Senator countered by 
contrasting the President’s strategies to fight terrorism to not only previous President’s 
from both parties, but the current President’s father as well, George H.W. Bush.   
Bush reviewed Senator Kerry’s record of opposition to former Presidents’ foreign 
policy decisions on the Middle East, the Cold War, and military expenditures.  He 
questioned the Senator’s loyalty to the values and goals symbolized by noteworthy 
Democratic leaders.  For example, at a rally held in Ohio on October 27 the President 
presented the Senator’s betrayal of the principles, which guided former Presidents from 
the Democratic Party during wartime:   
When Ronald Reagan was confronting the Soviet Union at the height of 
the Cold War, Senator Kerry said that President Reagan's policy of peace 
through strength was making America less safe.  History has shown that 
Senator Kerry was wrong and President Ronald Reagan was right.  When 
former President Bush led a coalition against Saddam Hussein in1991, 
Senator Kerry voted against the use of forces to liberate Kuwait.  History 
has shown that Senator Kerry was wrong and former President Bush was 
right….  During the last 20 years, in key moments of challenge and 
decision for America, Senator Kerry has chosen the position of weakness 
and inaction.  With that record, he stands in opposition not just to me, but 
to the great tradition of the Democratic Party.  The party of Franklin 
Roosevelt, the party of Harry Truman, the party of John Kennedy is 
rightly remembered for confidence and resolve in times of war and hours 
of crisis.  Senator Kerry has turned his back on “pay any price” and “bear 
any burden,” and he has replaced those commitments with “wait and see,” 
and “cut and run.”  (103-112) 
 
The President illustrated why the Senator was the wrong candidate to guide America 
toward national security by listing the failings of the Senator’s congressional record.  
In order to highlight the differences between his and the President’s foreign policy 
approaches to terrorism, the Senator also placed U.S. alliance building in Iraq in the 
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context of other conflicts fought by previous Presidents during the Cold War.19  On a 
campaign stop before a group of supporters at Temple University on September 24, 
Senator Kerry compared his opponent’s inability to build alliances to the first President 
Bush’s successful coalition building during the Gulf War, as well as President Clinton’s 
achievement in leading NATO forces to manage the fall-out from the Soviet collapse in 
Eastern Europe: 
The first President Bush waged the first Gulf War with a real coalition that 
fought with us on the battlefield and paid virtually the entire cost of that 
war.  President Clinton built a real coalition in Kosovo, and now virtually 
every soldier on patrol there comes from a foreign country.  During the 
Cold War, every American president understood what is still true today:  
The strength of our country is vital but so is the character of our country.  
It is better to be an America that rallies others to our cause than an 
America that has to go it alone.  (208-211)  
 
During the Homeland Security and Foreign Policy debate, Senator Kerry 
illustrated how the President’s pre-emptive war strategy had decreased U.S. credibility 
with world leaders and as a result made American leadership precarious.  He explained 
that President Kennedy was able to quickly avert a nuclear confrontation with the 
U.S.S.R. during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 because the United States was held in 
high regard abroad: 
I mean, we can remember when President Kennedy in the Cuban missile 
crisis sent his secretary of state to Paris to meet with DeGaulle.  And in the 
middle of the discussion, to tell them about the missiles in Cuba, he said, 
“Here, let me show you the photos.”  And DeGaulle waved them off and 
said, “No, no, no, no.  The word of the president of the United States is 
good enough for me.”  How many leaders in the world today would 
respond to us, as a result of what we’ve done, in that way?  So what is at 
test here is the credibility of the United States of America and how we 
lead the world.  (777-782)  
 
                                                 
 
 
19 See sentence ten of the rally speech the Senator gave to a crowd in Ohio on October, 21st. 
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The Senator hinted but did not state clearly that unreliable intelligence about weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq had expedited a legally dubious invasion of Iraq, and thus the 
President’s actions had not only tarnished the U.S. image abroad, but it had strained 
relations with our allies. 
 Since the candidates compared their strategies to fight the War on Terror by 
placing these in the context of noteworthy former Presidents’ foreign policy decisions, 
they were able to define the dimensions of debate over not only the current war but the 
meaning of past wars.  Learning from previous wartime presidents lent clarity to the ways 
in which American moral authority is established.  The historical role of previous wars, 
such as WWII, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, as well as former wartime 
presidents, helped the candidates to argue that they had the character that was needed to 
lead the nation.  Using war to demonstrate American supremacy abroad was an effective 
mechanism for the President and the Senator to define their candidacy and to shape the 
margins of debate around the moral certitude with which America conducts itself during 
wartime. 
Contesting Images of Patriotism 
Contesting images of patriotism demonstrated the underlying values that guided 
the candidates’ responses to the attack of 9/11 and the consequences for the meaning of 
patriotism.  Questions of patriotism surfaced as the candidates presented their plans to 
fight the War on Terror, discussed foreign policy in the Middle East, and set their 
agendas for domestic policy.  As each candidate presented his platform, the basic 
principles of democracy provided the context to evaluate images of patriotism that 
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granted America the moral authority to lead the world in the War on Terror.20  At the 
Republican National Convention on September 2 in New York City, the President 
illustrated the reasons the United States was ideally situated to lead the War on Terror 
and liberate the Middle East, as well as sustain liberty at home:  
I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of 
American strength is to advance freedom.  As the citizens of Afghanistan 
and Iraq seize the moment, their example will send a message of hope 
throughout a vital region.  Palestinians will hear the message that 
democracy and reform are within their reach, and so is peace with our 
good friend Israel.  Young women across the Middle East will hear the 
message that their day of equality and justice is coming.  Young men will 
hear the message that national progress and dignity are found in liberty, 
not tyranny and terror.  Reformers, and political prisoners, and exiles will 
hear the message that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever.  
And as freedom advances heart by heart, and nation by nation America 
will be more secure and the world more peaceful…..  The progress we and 
our friends and allies seek in the broader Middle East will not come easily, 
or all at once.  Yet Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by 
the power of liberty to transform lives and nations.  That power brought 
settlers on perilous journeys, inspired colonies to rebellion, ended the sin 
of slavery, and set our Nation against the tyrannies of the 20th century….  
I believe that America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a new 
century.  I believe that millions in the Middle East plead in silence for 
their liberty.  I believe that given the chance, they will embrace the most 
honorable form of government ever devised by man.  I believe all these 
things because freedom is not America’s gift to the world, it is the 
Almighty God's gift to every man and woman in this world.  (103-128) 
 
The effect of the strategies to fight the war upon the nation’s international 
reputation and the meaning of patriotism remained contentious between the two 
candidates.  In Senator Kerry’s opening speech of his campaign, the nomination speech at 
the Democratic Convention in Boston on July 29, he defined the meaning of patriotism in 
                                                 
 
 
20 To explore further the President’s presentations of patriotism see sentences 14 -26 and 145-153 from his 
nomination speech at the Republican National Convention. 
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an effort to undermine the margins of debate the President’s and his administration’s 
response to 9/11 had created.21  He reasoned that the President’s narrow meaning of 
patriotism following 9/11 and throughout his presidency created political division within 
America and between America and the world.  Although the Senator broadened the 
acceptable debate on the meaning of patriotism, the margins of the debate remained 
centered around a discussion of values over the right use of U.S. power abroad.  It was 
assumed, by both candidates, that the United States was the only nation that could guide 
world affairs and therefore, it should provide the benchmark for moral action in 
international conflicts: 
And tonight, we have an important message for those who question the 
patriotism of Americans who offer a better direction for our country.  
Before wrapping themselves in the flag and shutting their eyes and ears to 
the truth, they should remember what America is really all about.  They 
should remember the great idea of freedom for which so many have given 
their lives.  Our purpose now is to reclaim democracy itself.  We are here 
to affirm that when Americans stand up and speak their minds and say 
America can do better, that is not a challenge to patriotism; it is the heart 
and soul of patriotism.  You see that flag up there.  We call her Old Glory.  
The stars and stripes forever.  I fought under that flag, as did so many of 
you here and all across our country.  That flag flew from the gun turret 
right behind my head.  It was shot through and through and tattered, but it 
never ceased to wave in the wind.  It draped the caskets of men I served 
with and friends I grew up with.  For us, that flag is the most powerful 
symbol of who we are and what we believe in.  Our strength.  Our 
diversity.  Our love of country.  All that makes America both great and 
good.  That flag doesn’t [sic] belong to any president.  It doesn’t belong to 
any ideology and it doesn’t [sic] belong to any political party.  It belongs 
to all the American people….  You don’t value families if you force them 
to take up a collection to buy body armor for a son or daughter in the 
service, if you deny veterans health care, or if you tell middle class 
families to wait for a tax cut, so that the wealthiest among us can get even 
                                                 
 
 
21 For another illustration of Senator’s Kerry’s response to the President’s foreign policies see the rally 
speech “A New Course for America,” he gave on September 2 in Ohio, sentences 17-28. 
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more.  We believe in the value of doing what’s right for everyone in the 
American family….  We believe that what matters most is not narrow 
appeals masquerading as values, but the shared values that show the true 
face of America….  Family and faith.  Hard work and responsibility….  I 
don't want to claim that God is on our side.  As Abraham Lincoln told us, I 
want to pray humbly that we are on God’s side.  And whatever our faith, 
one belief should bind us all: The measure of our character is our 
willingness to give of ourselves for others and for our country….  They’re 
American values.  We believe in them.  They’re who we are.  And if we 
honor them, if we believe in ourselves, we can build an America that’s 
stronger at home and respected in the world.  (126-190  
 
Senator Kerry contested the values that the President had projected abroad in the 
fight against terrorism; and he used this as an opportunity to illustrate the need to restore 
the values that America had once truly upheld to safeguard freedom to demonstrate his 
interpretation of patriotism.  Ironically, however, this idea was the foundation for both 
candidates’ arguments about the necessity of U.S. leadership on the global stage to 
combat terrorism.  Although President Bush and Senator Kerry disagreed over the values 
that built moral fortitude for national character, neither candidate disputed that the United 
States is entitled to lead the War on Terror.   
The President maintained that the War on Terror was waged to protect Americans 
and to help Iraqis establish a democracy.22  At the President’s press conference with Iraqi 
Prime Minister Allawi on September 23, he pledged America’s continued support for 
Iraq and acknowledged the strides that the Prime Minister and the Iraqi people had made 
toward democracy:   
Iraqis and their leaders are engaged in a great and historic enterprise to 
establish a new democracy at the heart of a vital region.  As friends of 
                                                 
 
 
22 To see more illustrations of the President’s view of the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq see 
sentences 50-55 and 75-82 of the President’s press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi. 
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liberty, the new leaders of Iraq are friends of America, and all civilized 
nations.  As enemies of tyranny and terror, the people of Iraq…have been 
the target of acts of violence.  The enemies of freedom are using suicide 
bombing, beheadings, and other horrific acts to try to block progress…but 
we’ll never be intimidated.  And freedom is winning.  Mr. Prime Minister, 
America will stand with you until freedom and justice have prevailed.  
America’s security and Iraq’s future depend on it.  The Iraqi people are 
showing great courage and great determination…  The path to our safety 
and to Iraq’s future as a democratic nation lies in the resolute defense of 
freedom.  If we stop fighting the terrorists in Iraq, they would be free to 
plot and plan attacks elsewhere, in America and other free nations.  To 
retreat now would betray our mission, our word, and our friends.  Mr. 
Prime Minister, America will keep it's commitments.  (8-22) 
 
The President believed that the liberation of Iraq would encourage the world to denounce 
radical Islam and terrorism, while Senator Kerry argued that the United States was no 
longer the ideal that inspires others.  American idealism has been one of the nation’s most 
enduring accomplishments and has been a common staple in American thought.  Senator 
Kerry drew upon this ideal to discuss his strategy to fight terrorism with his supporters at 
Temple University on September 24:   
For al Qaeda, this war is a struggle for the heart and soul of the Muslim 
world.  We will win this war only if the terrorists lose that struggle…  We 
will win when they once again see America as the champion, not the 
enemy, of their legitimate yearning to live in just and peaceful societies….  
The world knows the difference between empty promises and genuine 
commitment.  So we will win when we show that America uses its 
economic power for the common good, doing our share to defeat the 
abject poverty, hunger, and disease that destroy lives and create failed 
states in every part of the world.  We will win when we work with our 
allies, to enable children in poor countries to get a quality basic education. 
…  The future is a race between schools that spark learning and schools 
that teach hate.  We have to preempt the haters.  We have to win the war 
of ideas.  New generations must believe there is more to life than salvation 
through martyrdom….  I know that it will be a long and difficult struggle.  
I know we have to be resolute in confronting the evil that exists in the 
world.  But in the end, one of our greatest strengths, one of our greatest 
safeguards, is that America can be the ideal that inspires others 
everywhere.  If we again become that beacon of hope, we will discover in 
ourselves the most powerful and useful weapons in the war against the 
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terrorists.  Because if we are true to ourselves, terrorists cannot defeat the 
values and vision that have made America great.  (165-220) 
  
For a successful culmination to the hostilities between the West and the Muslim world, 
Senator Kerry believed not only must America export its democratic ideals it must again 
restore them at home in order to be an effective architect of democracy to defeat 
terrorism.  The Senator argued that the decision to invade Iraq and the President’s 
execution of the War on Terror eroded the hope that America represented to oppressed 
peoples.  It was essential to re-establish America’s moral authority in order for the United 
States to continue to lead the battle against terrorism not only on the stage of public 
opinion but also on the ground in Iraq and the broader Middle East. 
 The candidates campaigned for service members and their families and assured 
them that they would receive the honor and support they deserved from America.  For the 
President, the troops and their loved ones deserved respect and admiration as they 
supported America’s effort to defend freedom aboard and at home.23  At a rally in Florida 
on October 23, the President stated that American soldiers have demonstrated what the 
United States has achieved with its military strength in Iraq for world peace and 
democracy.  Unlike the Senator whose voting record on funding for the war was less than 
reliable, the President stressed that troops would continue to receive support for their 
missions if he was re-elected president:   
                                                 
 
 
23 For further examples of the President’s depiction of U.S. service members see sentences 131-142 of his 
nomination speech at the Republican National Convention and his rally speech in Iowa on  October 25, 
“Whether Polls Up or Down I'll Always Support Military.” 
 74 
I want to thank those who wear the uniform who are here today.  Thank 
you for your service.  I want to thank the veterans who are here for having 
set such a great example for those who wear the uniform.  I want to thank 
the military families who are here.  And I assure you, we will continue to 
support our troops in harm’s way.  That is why I went to the United States 
Congress and proposed $87 billion in supplemental funding, to make sure 
our troops had that which they need to complete their missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  We received great bipartisan support for that 
funding.  As you gather the [sic] vote, I want you to remind your friends 
and neighbors of this startling statistic: Only four members of the United 
States Senate, four out of a hundred, voted to authorize the use of force 
and then voted against providing the funding necessary to supporting our 
troops in harm's way.  And two of those four were my opponent and his 
running mate.  So they asked him, why did you make the vote?  And you 
might remember the most famous quote of the 2004 campaign, I actually 
did vote for the $87 billion right before I voted against it.  They kept 
pressing him and he finally said the whole thing was a complicated matter.  
There is nothing complicated about supporting our troops in combat.  (67-
79) 
 
Senator Kerry replied that not only did he promise to support the troops while 
they were in combat, but he also would support their dreams when they returned home.  
He referred directly back to the opportunities that were not forwarded to the soldiers of 
Vietnam when they returned home to illustrate the need to provide these opportunities to 
veterans of the current conflict.24  At the 86th Annual American Legion Convention on 
September 1, the Senator emphasized that the American dream must be restored for all 
the nation’s citizens, and especially for the citizen-soldiers who have defended the 
nation’s freedom in Iraq and the broader Middle East: 
You know that the pledge we took to defend America is also a pledge to 
protect the promise America offers.  And let there be no doubt – when I 
                                                 
 
 
24 For another example of the Senator, emphasizing his ability to unite the nation based on his military 
service in Vietnam see sentences 58-61 and 191-196 of his nomination speech at the Democratic 
Convention.   
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am president, you will have a fellow veteran in the White House who 
understands that those who fought for our country abroad should never 
have to fight for what they were promised at home….  I also want to speak 
directly for a moment to those currently risking their lives as faraway as 
Iraq and Afghanistan. America’s prayers are with you.  We honor your 
service, thank you for your sacrifice and we pledge to stand with your 
families as you stand for ours….  I want to speak today about one other 
great challenge.  When the troops who are fighting for us over there come 
home, we owe them an America where they can plan a future and get a job 
that lets them get ahead – an America  where military families are part of a 
growing middle-class, not struggling  to join it….  My friends, I believe 
that the full duty of the Commander-in-Chief is to lead an America where 
the benefits of American life are available to all who risked their lives 
defending it….  Our citizen soldiers are hardworking, middle-class 
Americans who live by real American values:  faith and family, service 
and sacrifice, responsibility and hard work.  They need jobs, health care, 
and a good education to live those values….  For our soldiers, for their 
families, and all those hardworking Americans looking to build a better 
life, we must pursue a path that once again places the American Dream 
within reach of every American citizen.  (4-87) 
 
Senator Kerry confirmed that supporting the troops abroad was important; and it was 
equally important to compensate them for their service by providing them with the 
benefits of an America that they had fought to protect.  Where as President Bush declared 
that once hostilities in Iraq ended the troops would come home with the honor and 
respect they deserve, the President did not lay out a plan comparable to the Senator’s to 
repay the debt the nation owed them for defending Americans’ freedom abroad.  
Although the candidates’ strategies differed on the ways to assist the nation’s military 
and their families, they agreed that funding the troops in combat should continue and 
neither called for an immediate troop withdrawal from Iraq. 
The President and the Senator defined presidential leadership by determining 
American values and employing the meaning of these values to facilitate presentations of 
their strategies to conclude the war in Iraq successfully, to fight an effective War on 
Terror, and pay tribute to U.S. service members engaged in the conflict abroad.  In 
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addition, both candidates linked the impact of the War on Terror upon both domestic and 
foreign policies for America (although the Senator did this more broadly, than the 
President did).  National security was the centralizing concept in the candidates’ rhetoric 
and the basis upon which America’s reputation and the success of all other domestic 
policies rested. 
Summary 
 Although all themes of the coding index were found in both candidates’ speeches, 
these themes took on different dimensions to frame and thereby limit the debate over 
America’s response to 9/11.  Responding to 9/11, arguing over prior wars, and contesting 
images of patriotism revealed how the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 set the 
stage for the candidates to embark on a foreign policy debate that reinforced U.S. power 
abroad.  These major themes clarified how the candidates set the margins of the debate 
and reinforced the necessity of U.S. military supremacy and American political ideology.  
Although the candidates differed on the extent to which the United States relied on 
diplomacy versus force to face the threat that terrorism poses, neither questioned whether 
America had the right to democratize the Middle East.  The key disagreements of the 
candidates’ foreign policy platforms were tactical differences:  whether an invasion of 
Iraq was necessary to fight terrorism or a distraction from the ‘real’ War on Terror.  They 
also disputed the degree to which the United States should rely upon multilateralism to 
support its efforts to fight terrorism.  Even though the candidates attempted to 
demonstrate their fitness to lead the War on Terror by constructing a distinctive response 
to terrorism, neither diverged from the belief that U.S. power was central to defeating 
terrorism. 
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Responding to 9/11 and its sub-themes, retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies, 
explored how the candidates re-constructed the events of 9/11 and what those events 
meant for U.S. supremacy abroad as well as the hatred that American idealism inspires.  
Therefore, the actions of our enemies did not merit deep analysis.  Rather than stopping 
to reflect, it was instead essential to act to protect democracy and freedom for future 
generations of Americans and to bring hope to all oppressed peoples.  The sub-theme, our 
allies, described the candidates’ views on U.S. relations with nations that were considered 
friendly towards American interests.  Senator Kerry insisted that decisions by U.S. 
leadership should consider the interests of the world community before taking action.  
However, the Senator agreed with the President that America had always reserved the 
right do defend itself and if elected President he would carry this tradition forward.  
Ultimately neither President Bush nor Senator Kerry questioned America’s militarized 
response to 9/11, nor did they question America’s right to dominate the international 
debate in response to terrorism. 
The second major category, arguing over prior wars, demonstrated the candidates’ 
descriptions of America’s military might and leadership in previous global conflicts.  
Both of the candidates recalled how WWII heightened the nation’s reputation at home 
and abroad.  The President campaigned to bring freedom and democracy to Iraq just like 
his predecessor President Truman who had made allies of the nation’s former enemy, the 
Japanese, following the end of WWII.  Senator Kerry chose to highlight the contributions 
of President Franklin Roosevelt who throughout his presidency instituted social reforms 
that stimulated a war economy to modernize the U.S. military in order to improve the 
nation’s ability to fight the Second World War.  The first sub-theme, arguing over the 
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Vietnam Syndrome, clarified the candidates’ positions on Iraq War policy.  The President 
referred back to the success that President Truman had with establishing a democracy in 
Japan to demonstrate that his plan to win the war would succeed.  Senator Kerry recalled 
his service during Vietnam to predict the failure of the President’s policy for imposing 
internal peace and democratic governance upon Iraq, and the cost to U.S. soldiers and the 
nation’s reputation abroad.  The second sub-theme, arguing over previous wartime 
presidents, examined how the candidates compared their records in office to other 
Presidents who had successfully facilitated peace and sustained the nation’s respect on 
the global stage.  President Bush referred to leaders of both the Democratic and 
Republican parties who had undertaken global conflicts with unwavering leadership to 
question the Senator’s voting record on military spending.  Senator Kerry contrasted 
President Bush’s ability to lead and his credibility with other world leaders to that of 
prior presidents, including the President’s father, former President George H. W. Bush.  
The Senator reminded his audiences that earlier Presidents had successfully surmounted 
similar obstacles to national security that President Bush now faced without 
compromising the nation’s ability to lead in crisis. 
The final major theme, contesting images of patriotism evaluated the candidates’ 
framing of what it meant to be American.  This theme examined the importance of 
patriotism during wartime, especially in presidential campaign rhetoric.  The candidates 
exhibited their ability to lead in terms of patriotic sentiment that engages the nation more 
during wartime than during peacetime.  Both candidates used images of patriotism to 
question their opponent’s ability to guide the nation through the War on Terror to a 
successful culmination.  The President and the Senator agreed that bringing freedom to 
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Iraq, democratizing the Middle East, and supporting the troops in combat were the 
prescription for ending hostilities in Iraq and fighting an effective War on Terror.  They 
disputed only the tactics that would accomplish their mutually shared objectives.  For the 
President the Iraq War was central to the War on Terror and he pledged to commit all 
resources needed to achieve victory in order to democratize Iraq and the broader Middle 
East.  The Senator viewed the war in Iraq as a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror 
that had not only overextended the military and domestic budgets, but also had fueled 
terrorist hatred for an American occupation.  However, with the right leadership, the 
Senator believed that hostilities in Iraq could be ended by simultaneously assembling a 
broad international coalition to support military operations while engaging the Middle 
East in a serious debate about democracy.  
The candidates’ campaign speeches provided the opportunity to explore how the 
dimensions of the debate were grounded in common themes.  Even as the candidates 
addressed different audiences whose perspectives on the war might have differed 
according to the organization or group they were associated with, the candidates 
sustained a limited debate over the meaning of the attacks of 9/11 and the nation’s 
foreign policy response.  These findings reflected a narrow spectrum of opinion over the 
place of U.S. power in world affairs.  They demonstrated how alternative explanations for 
the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and alternative responses to military intervention remained 
unaddressed in “official” debate and hence “ways of seeing” war remained limited to the 
detriment of a wider public debate.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
  The candidates framed the War on Terror using ideas about U.S. power, freedom, 
and patriotism in their rhetoric to differentiate themselves from their opponent, but as 
they clarified their positions, they failed to distinguish themselves from one another in 
any significant way.  The candidates used constructions of 9/11 to establish the right of 
the United States to lead the War on Terror in ways that ultimately facilitated a narrow 
debate over continuing U.S. leadership in global affairs. President Bush and Senator 
Kerry upheld the right of the United States to dominate the interpretation of world events 
and to act on these interpretations to establish American hegemony abroad as the only 
right, “natural order” of the global organization—the only alternative to safeguarding 
world peace in the face of terror.  The main differences between the candidates were:  
how U.S. leadership should fight the War on Terror, whether the Iraq War was central to 
the war prior to its U.S. invasion, and the degree to which unilateralism or multilateralism 
were inextricably linked to a successful culmination of the hostilities in Iraq and a 
victorious end to the War on Terror. 
  Prior scholarly investigations examined political rhetoric for themes that 
constructed U.S. power abroad, which dominated the interpretation of events subsequent 
to 9/11 and legitimized the invasion of Iraq and the War on Terror.  This study’s analysis 
of President Bush’s and Senator Kerry’s rhetoric contained similar themes to those found 
in prior research over this debate.  The themes that guided analysis of the candidates’ 
speeches revealed that the President and the Senator conducted a narrow debate about the 
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meaning of September the 11th and terrorism that failed to challenge the underlying 
directives that always have guided U.S. foreign policy. 
  The candidates’ rhetoric reinforced and maintained the idea that the United States 
is uniquely endowed with the right to democratize nations regardless of the local 
populace’s desires through diplomacy and force if deemed necessary by U.S. leadership 
in order to defend and advance American freedom.  The candidates sanctioned promoting 
freedom on the global stage to protect the interest of U.S. citizens; consequently, this 
ultimately reinforced the need to sustain American hegemony.  The major themes and 
their sub-themes clarified how the President and the Senator constructed a narrow debate 
that reinforced the need to protect America interests abroad.  Neither President Bush nor 
Senator Kerry questioned whether establishing a liberal democracy in Iraq was the right 
use of U.S. military strength in occupied Iraq, an effective means to curbing the power of 
militant Islam in the Middle East, or an effective method to fight terrorism. 
9/11 Frames – Responding to 9/11, retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies  
  
  Responding to 9/11 and its sub-themes retelling 9/11, our enemies, and our allies 
framed how the candidates made meaning of 9/11 to maintain U.S. power in the global 
order.  Prior investigations examined the techniques that U.S. leadership has used to set 
the perimeters of the debate over U.S. security.  Following the end of the Cold War, the 
first President Bush ushered in the concept of the New World Order (NWO), a worldview 
similar to Cold War ideology, which premised U.S. power upon the essential moral 
righteousness of freedom.  The ideology of the NWO is useful to understanding how U.S. 
leadership organizes the world to maintain and reproduce American hegemony through 
the identification of ‘outcasts’ who oppose the principles of the NWO (Lazar and Lazar 
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2004).  NWO dialogue framed campaign debate and set the range of dispute between the 
candidates over who was the enemy and what strategy would defeat the enemy by 
“prepar[ing] the ground for future violence” (Leuder et al. 2002:244).  President Bush 
and Senator Kerry continued to construct a response to 9/11, which the President had 
used to frame the War on Terror immediately following the attacks.  The President 
positioned America as a force for good that was fighting the War on Terror to rid the 
world of evil (Coe et al. 2004).  By placing the war as a battle between good and evil, the 
President was able to prepare the nation for war and provided the media with a “good 
news story” (Coe et al. 2004:237).  Since the binary discourse found in the President’s 
rhetoric following 9/11 was “stylistically pleasing and therefore suppl[ied]...pithy sound 
bites” (Coe et al. 2004:237), the President had the moral authority to prepare the nation 
for military action in opposition to the enemy (Leuder et al. 2002; Butt et al. 2004).  On 
national television before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President 
Bush proclaimed, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Coe et al 2004).  Presenting opposing 
dichotomies also helped the President and the Senator illustrate the necessity of 
defending freedom.  Retelling 9/11 further clarified how the candidates introduced the 
debate over the moral disposition of U.S. leadership that made U.S. power integral to 
fighting tyranny and terrorism.  
  The candidates broadened the debate by disputing whether Saddam Hussein was a 
terrorist threat.  However, they sustained the use of honorable images and dishonorable 
images (Murphy 2003; Merskin 2004) when discussing the U.S. removal of the dictator 
to divide the world between the competing forces of freedom and tyranny.  In his 
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September 11, 2001 statement to the nation the President declared that “Our very 
freedom came under attack….America was targeted for attack because we’re the 
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world…thousands of lives were 
suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror” (Merskin 2004).  During the campaign, 
the President again defended his decision to invade Iraq and remove the dictator from 
power.  On October 11 in New Mexico at a 2004 Campaign Rally the President insisted 
“Do I forget the lessons of September the 11th and take the word of a madman, or do I 
take action to defend our country?”  The Senator contested the President’s choice of 
enemies on the campaign trail at Temple University on September 24, 2004.  Senator 
Kerry argued that “George Bush made Saddam Hussein the priority.  I would have made 
Osama bin Laden the priority.”   
  The candidates gave meaning to 9/11 by contextualizing the Iraq War and the 
War on Terror within moral constraints to establish a dialogue about protecting American 
lives by targeting terrorists for destruction.  Responding to 9/11 captured the candidates’ 
argument for a U.S. led war against our enemies who feared the democratization of Iraq 
and the Middle East, and established a narrow debate over U.S. foreign policy that 
marginalized other interpretations of 9/11.  The candidates failed to provide a critical 
perspective about the effectiveness of establishing freedom through militarization and 
therefore, they did not address the moral ambiguity of American hegemony. 
  At the Republican National Convention the President asserted that the “terrorists 
are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest 
fear,” and when the Senator spoke at Temple University during the campaign he agreed 
that, the outcome of the War on Terror “will determine whether we and our children live 
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in freedom or in fear.”  The candidates disputed specific strategies to advance freedom 
and liberty abroad, but they did not question the integrity of U.S. foreign policy.  
Although Senator Kerry was the opposition candidate, he remained loyal to the political 
elite.  In order to prove his legitimacy as a candidate to the Washington Establishment, 
the Senator was unable to dispute established foreign policy directives.  Ultimately, 
without a sizeable social movement that might legitimate a break with conventional 
wisdom, neither candidate was able to question the integrity of U.S. foreign policy 
without jeopardizing their bid for the presidency.  Therefore, the right of the United 
States to fight to protect freedom remained central to the strategies both candidates 
proposed to combat terrorism. The candidates questioned whether their opponent’s 
leadership or their own would eliminate the power of radical Islamists, and manage 
international complaints about the way in which the war was conducted.  The candidates 
disputed one another’s strategies based on who could forge a stronger coalition of allies 
through U.N. mandated procedures and sustain global support for the Iraq War and the 
broader War on Terror.  Although they disputed whether Iraq was a threat prior to the 
U.S. occupation, they both agreed that terrorism threatened post-invasion Iraq and that 
the democratization of Iraq was essential for freedom to prevail and to preserve the 
American way-of-life. 
War Frames – Learning from Prior Wars, arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, and 
arguing over previous wartime presidents 
  The candidates framed the Iraq War and the War on Terror by revisiting the 
conduct of American leaders who faced similar threats to national security.  Learning 
from prior wars, arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome, and arguing over previous wartime 
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presidents characterized this dimension of the debate between President Bush and 
Senator Kerry.  In order to highlight whether or not the Iraq War and the War on Terror 
were wise investments of American military strength, the candidates gave an accounting 
of American involvement in prior global conflicts.   
  Similar to findings of other studies of war rhetoric, the 2004 Candidates urged the 
nation to put the safety and welfare of America above self-interest.  Call-to-arms texts, 
like the speeches given by the President immediately following 9/11, serve to not only 
identify the enemy, but they also usher in a new era of threat that is symbolized by 
national unification against an enemy who endangers dearly held collective values 
(Graham et al. 2004).  Although call-to-arms addresses pose as revolutionary, their 
reactionary nature actually serves “to preserve the status-quo of a particular group; they 
simultaneously – almost invariably – function to ultimately undermine the order which 
the reactionary forces seek to preserve” (Graham et. al. 2004:202).  Five days following 
9/11, the President reproduced the idea of the armed nation-state as the only legitimate 
force powerful enough to confront those who opposed freedom.  As many of his 
predecessors had done in previous epochs, President Bush stated to a national audience 
that the “American people are used to conflict where there was a beachhead or a dessert 
to cross” (Graham et al. 2004:211).  In his rhetoric during the 2004 campaign, President 
Bush reminded an audience in New Mexico that “it wasn't all that long ago that we were 
fighting the Japanese;” and on the same day in New Mexico, Senator Kerry also 
reminisced with his supporters about events following the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The 
Senator stated, “In the summer of 1942, with the scars of Pearl Harbor still fresh, 
Americans were gearing up for battle.”  Call-to-arms texts effectively maintain elite 
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hegemony over political ideas about life and country because competing ideas about war 
that threaten the “official” dialogue are marginalized in the public spaces (Graham et al. 
2004).  Learning from prior wars captured how the candidates compared the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11 to other times in the nation’s history when freedom was under attack.  
The candidates agreed that another attack on American shores must be avoided.  The 
President and the Senator were in a unique position as presidential aspirants to direct 
public opposition to terrorism, maintain the authority of the state, and limit “official” 
debate over foreign policy matters and national security.  Just as the defense of American 
interests following the attack on Pearl Harbor led to WWII and ultimately America was 
strengthened by that war’s outcome, the War on Terror according to the candidates would 
achieve the same ends if the nation rallied to the cause of freedom.   
  Because during wartime U.S. leadership is particularly dependent on presenting 
itself as an agent of freedom (Murphy 2003), it was important for the candidates to link 
their candidacy to historically significant conflicts, which encouraged the public to 
entertain particular ideas about the power of freedom over the enemy.  President Bush 
claimed that the United States would make allies of the Iraqis through democratization, 
just as President Harry Truman had made allies of the Japanese following the end of 
WWII.  The Senator chose to demonstrate his ability to lead in both foreign and domestic 
policy by illustrating how President Franklin Roosevelt used the imagination of 
Americans at home to generate technological innovation and create a diversified labor 
force to win WWII; and while simultaneously implementing social reforms that rewarded 
soldiers for their service upon their return home.  The candidates defined the nature of 
U.S. power within a historical continuity that imparted the candidates’ vision for the 
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nation, which placed American freedom in opposition to militant Islamists, and 
simultaneously prepared the nation to continue the war effort (Coe et al. 2004; Butt et al. 
2004; Leuder et al. 2002).   
  Arguing over the Vietnam Syndrome referred to the candidates’ dispute over the 
threat Iraq posed to national security prior to the invasion and over the reliability of the 
intelligence that led to the President’s decision to invade Iraq.  The tactics that the United 
States implemented to limit and ultimately eliminate the power of militant Islam in Iraq 
was the basis upon which the candidates attacked one another’s credibility in foreign 
policy matters related to the Middle East and terrorism.  The President defended his 
administration’s war policy in Iraq by refusing to acknowledge that an analogy could be 
drawn between his policy in Iraq and the policies of the Johnson administration during 
the Vietnam War.  Instead, the President attacked the Senator’s ambivalent voting record 
for troop funding to condemn Senator Kerry’s position on the war as “a cut and run 
tactic” that would ultimately fail to secure freedom for future generations of Americans 
and Iraqis.  In reply, Senator Kerry emphasized this analogy to strengthen his argument 
that the Iraq War was “the wrong war at the wrong time,” and that the President’s 
decision to invade Iraq ultimately weakened the nation’s ability to defend itself.  Just as 
the Vietnam War came to be viewed as an unnecessary escalation of American military 
commitments that ultimately did not stem the spread of Communist forces, Senator Kerry 
countered that the Iraq War had increased terrorist activity, instead of diminishing it.  
Although the candidates disagreed over who was a threat, ultimately both the Senator and 
the President maintained that America has the right to dictate the limits of its global 
power to oppose its enemies (Lazar and Lazar 2004; Butt et al. 2004).  Even as the 
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candidates disputed the Iraq War, President Bush and Senator Kerry both feared Western 
ideas losing ground in the Eastern world if U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq failed.  Thus, 
whose leadership, the President’s or the Senator’s would secure victory was pivotal to the 
dispute over Iraq.   
  Both the President and the Senator examined the leadership of former Presidents 
John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton to question their 
opponent’s ability to unify America and other nations against terrorism and thereby 
return peace and order to the world.  Both former President Kennedy and President 
Reagan successful engaged the world community to combat Communism and establish 
world peace; and both the first President Bush and President Clinton engaged NATO 
forces to restore order in regional disputes.  The President and the Senator presented a 
debate over the degree to which the United States should rely on multilateral diplomacy 
or military force, like their predecessors had, to achieve victory and the consequences for 
freedom if America did not succeed in securing Iraq. 
Patriotism Frames – Contesting Images of Patriotism 
  The last major theme, contesting images of patriotism, captured how the 
candidates framed the debate over defining patriotism.  The Senator widened the debate 
over American patriotism that the President had initiated immediately following 9/11, but 
Senator Kerry continued to emphasize that America had the moral authority to 
democratize Iraq to stabilize the Middle East and combat terrorism.  Questions arose 
about whether the candidates’ patriotism would negatively effect the nation’s 
determination to continue combating terrorism.  Conducting the Iraq War and the War on 
Terror were central to understanding how the dispute between the two candidates was 
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shaped by images of patriotism.  They contested the values that a U.S. President must 
possess to successfully eliminate the power of militant Islamists. 
  To prove their fitness to lead the nation in the War on Terror, the candidates 
evoked the commitment of previous generations who served God’s will to defend 
freedom against an immoral enemy.  Similar to previous studies, this study found that 
battle between America and terrorism was a powerful mechanism to present the War on 
Terror as a test of “the nation’s soul” (Murphy 2003:624).  President Bush and Senator 
Kerry emphasized that just as previous generations of Americans had fought to preserve 
freedom, this generation must now defend freedom for their children and grandchildren 
or face the destruction of the American way-of-life.  Two days following 9/11, the 
President addressed the American people to inspire them to take responsibility for their 
freedom and for the freedom of future generations of Americans.  He reminded them of 
the task ahead “Our nation—this generation—will lift the dark threat of violence from 
our people and our future” (Murphy 2003).  He reminded his constituents again as he 
announced his nomination for the 2004 Presidential Campaign that “I believe that 
America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a new century,” because he believed, 
“freedom is not America's gift to the world, it is the Almighty God's gift to every man 
and woman in the world.”  Whereas Senator Kerry at the Democratic National 
Convention not only urged Americans to “remember the great idea of freedom for which 
so many have given their lives,” he also challenged Americans to “reclaim democracy 
itself.”  Senator Kerry held that dissent “is the heart and soul of patriotism,” and that he 
needed to ascertain that “we are on God's side.”   
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  The Senator questioned the validity of the President’s conception of patriotism, 
which up until the election had remained unchallenged (Murphy 2003).  The Senator 
disputed the frames that the President had put in place to launch the War on Terror, by 
redefining images of patriotism and service to country as he announced his candidacy: 
“You see that flag up there.  We call her Old Glory…  It draped the caskets of men I 
served with and friends I grew up with.  For us, that flag is the most powerful symbol of 
who we are and what we believe in.  Our strength.  Our diversity.  Our love of country.  
All that makes America both great and good.  That flag doesn't belong to any president.  
It doesn't belong to any ideology and it doesn't belong to any political party.  It belongs to 
all the American people.”  The candidates established their ability to lead the War on 
Terror by demanding of themselves and their constituents to honor the nation’s history of 
fighting for freedom (Murphy 2003).  
  The President and the Senator agreed that America’s founding commitment to 
democracy made American leadership essential to battling the terrorists, who feared 
freedom (Coe et al. 2004; Lazar and Lazar 2004; Merskin 2004), and also made America 
a natural ally to the those who opposed terrorism.  When the President held a press 
conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi, he reiterated that America was committed 
to fighting for Iraq’s freedom:  “If we stop fighting the terrorists in Iraq, they would be 
free to plot and plan attacks elsewhere, in America and other free nations.  To retreat now 
would betray our mission, our word, and our friends.  Mr. Prime Minister, America will 
keep it's commitments.”  Similarly, Senator Kerry stated on the campaign trail at Temple 
University that he believed that in the Middle East:  “New generations must believe there 
is more to life than salvation through martyrdom…I know that it will be a long and 
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difficult struggle.  I know we have to be resolute in confronting the evil that exists in the 
world.  But in the end, one of our greatest strengths, one of our greatest safeguards, is that 
America can be the ideal that inspires others everywhere.”     
  Even as the candidates disputed one another’s ability to lead the nation forward, 
the candidates ultimately agreed that U.S. leaders must continue to support the nation’s 
mission abroad in order to inspire other peoples to pursue freedom.  Both of the 
candidates agreed that funding the troops was essential to completing the mission, but 
they disputed the degree to which U.S. service members should be supported by 
government funds.  In order to win the war the President promised to continue funding 
the troops who were combating terrorists.  In contrast, the Senator predicted disastrous 
consequences for troop moral if a more rational approach was not adopted to provide 
service members with not only the equipment they needed to win the conflict in Iraq and 
the War on Terror but also the resources they needed to establish civilian lives upon their 
return home.  Senator Kerry advocated the American Dream not only for service 
members, the Senator insisted that it must be renewed for all of Americans.  In addition, 
the Senator emphasized that renewing the American Dream at home also would inspire 
Iraqis and the Middle East to disavow the teachings of radical Islam.  Paradoxically, the 
promise that America offers also reinforces the supremacy of America power abroad and 
allows the United States to dominate the global power structure.  
  The candidates disputed the meaning of freedom, but shared the goal of making 
the world safe for freedom.  Since America was founded upon its citizen’s commitment 
to freedom, the candidates agreed that the United States held the unique right to protect 
freedom from terrorists and guard the nation’s well-being abroad.  President Bush 
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considered his policy the only legitimate path to freeing Iraq, while simultaneously 
securing the nation from terrorism.  Senator Kerry argued that the continuing forward 
with the President Bush’s plan was a mistake.  Tactics not only had to be changed on the 
ground in Iraq, but contention within the international community over the President’s 
handling of Iraq and the War on Terror had to be resolved in order to return America and 
its military to a position of honor and strength.    
  Prior studies that examined President Bush’s rhetoric following 9/11 revealed that 
the strategies the President used to make meaning of the terrorist attacks sanctioned state 
violence and opened a new epoch dominated by war.  The War on Terror provided a 
familiar framework within which to understand the mechanisms that U.S. leaders use to 
appropriate power for the nation and thereby dominate the global superstructure with 
their ideas about freedom.  These studies acknowledge that U.S. power is rooted in the 
belief that America is founded upon the most honorable government ever devised.  
Consequently its leaders are assumed to be imbued with the moral authority to lead the 
world toward freedom.  But prior investigations of American hegemony fail to address 
that the nation’s leaders also are empowered because they are located in the nexus of 
political and economic power.  Prior investigations were sufficient to engage 
understanding about how the worldview of America has dominated global affairs.  
However, these studies failed to address how in conjunction with leaders’ ability to 
project U.S. moral authority abroad and at home, specifically since 9/11, political leaders 
as members of the U.S. elite are in a position to claim that the American people share 
their will.   
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  As members of the U.S. political elite, President Bush and Senator Kerry were 
uniquely positioned to dominate interpretation of the events subsequent to 9/11.  They 
shaped their campaign rhetoric in the interest of the foreign policy objectives of the 
Washington Establishment to the detriment of a wider public debate over the meaning of 
freedom, while simultaneously marginalizing alternative explanations for 9/11.  Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1929), who spent years in prison (1929 to 1935) for his 
opposition to a Fascist state and eventually died while imprisoned, wrote that “one cannot 
choose the form of war one wants, unless from the start one has a crushing superiority 
over the enemy” (p. 234).  Not only is Gramsci referring to battlefield incursions, but he 
is also referring to the power of the elite in democratic states to determine the range of 
debate about issues that are determined to be in the national interest (1929).  According to 
Gramsci (1933), members of the elite political class, like President Bush and Senator 
Kerry, in advanced states, such as the United States, are able to define the range of 
acceptable debate over threats to national security because the candidates represent 
political parties that “provide the cultural and general ideological nature for a great 
movement of interrelated parties,” and are “fractions of one and the same organic party,” 
the political economic elite (pp. 149-150).  In addition, the candidates were able to 
maintain and reproduce elite hegemony over the interpretation of the war because, 
according to Gramsci’s (1933) theory of hegemony, although the masses appear to have 
political influence, they actually “have no other political function than a generic loyalty, 
of a military kind, to a visible or invisible political centre” (p. 150).  Consequently, 
Gramsci (1933) concludes that they are “kept happy by means of moralizing sermons, 
emotional stimuli, and messianic myths of an awaited golden age, in which all present 
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contradictions and miseries will be automatically resolved and made well” (p. 150).  
Because the superiority of U.S. military strength was a formidable foe to dispute and an 
effective means to enforce American hegemony, the candidates could promise a 
restoration of world peace and the return of national security through an eventual victory 
over terrorism.  Not only does the power of American hegemony lie in the moral 
authority of its leaders, it is sustained through its leader’s connections to the political and 
economic elite, as well as the public’s conviction in their leaders’ moral authority. 
  Emile Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness explains why the 
candidates competing frames of the meaning of 9/11 and the War on Terror were 
informed by freedom and powerfully illustrated American hegemony over the form that 
democracy takes in Iraq and the Middle East.  The President and the Senator were able to 
influence public opinion about the War on Terror not only because they were uniquely 
positioned to do so by virtue of their candidacy, but also because the hallmark of the 
collective consciousness in a democracy is the belief in “reciprocity of rights and duties” 
(Jones 2006:23).  This belief encompasses the relationship between the individual and the 
state (Jones 2006).  Furthermore, according to Durkheim’s theory of collective 
consciousness, in a democracy the state has a moral obligation to realize the “progressive 
liberation” of its citizens (Jones 2006:27).  The debate between the candidates over the 
War on Terror not only reinforced the power of freedom, but it highlighted the point they 
disputed the most:  whether their opponent’s strategies to fight the war would serve to 
preserve freedom at home by furthering democracy abroad.  Most importantly 
Durkheim’s concept explains how the candidates’ war rhetoric was important to not only 
maintaining the promise that America offers to its citizens and to all who clamor for it;  
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collective consciousness also explains why the candidates endorsed the protection of 
American liberty by promoting freedom to those living under the oppression of Radical 
Islam.   
  The candidates’ competing frames presented the meaning of freedom and 
terrorism and established the necessity of U.S. power abroad to protect national security.  
Ultimately, America’s moral obligation to defend freedom narrowed the debate between 
the candidates over U.S. foreign policy.  Consequently, the candidates’ competing frames 
of American hegemony reinforced the nation’s right to defend itself and export American 
values abroad to the detriment of a more critical debate about patriotism.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Typically it is thought the Republicans and the Democrats represent two distinct 
camps of thought, but this study found that the candidates from these two major political 
parties were in agreement over the use of American military strength and the role of the 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  Although the candidates disputed whether Iraq 
was a central front of the War on Terror prior to the U.S. occupation, they agreed that 
only freedom and the democratization of Iraq would bring peace to Iraq and the Middle 
East.  Both President Bush and Senator Kerry shared the same goals of protecting 
Americans at home and simultaneously ending hostilities in Iraq and fighting the War on 
Terror through the promotion of Western constructions of freedom.  The candidates 
believed that freedom would dispel the power of Radical Islam in Iraq and the broader 
Middle East, although the tactics to implement this shared aim were disputed by the two 
men.  Therefore, for the candidates, not only was the War on Terror a military strategy, it 
was also a quest to establish the supremacy of American hegemony over competing 
Eastern ideologies regarding how power should be organized.   
 Because President Bush and Senator Kerry believed that the founding principles 
of the nation gave the United States a legitimate right to advance freedom, they did not 
question whether the nation had the right to democratize regions of the world they 
believed were held hostage by terrorism.  Traditional foreign policy perspectives 
informed the candidate’s strategies to fight terrorism.  Because foreign policy discourse 
has its basis in the notion that the America is a champion of the oppressed, it naturally 
follows that the United States is entitled to dictate the global power arrangement (Ken 
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Kyle 2001).  Although the candidates disputed the strategies that maintain America 
benevolence in opposition to tyranny, they were in agreement over how the world should 
be organized.  Following the principles of national security discourse (Kyle 2001), 
President Bush emphasized that America must safeguard the world for freedom to 
flourish.  Senator Kerry argued that the President showed an over reliance upon the use of 
force to democratize Iraq and fight terrorism. However, he did not debate the discourse of 
progressive liberalism.  Progressive liberalism is guided by the understanding that liberal 
democracy is preferable to other forms of governance (Kyle 2001).  Therefore as the 
natural steward of freedom, the U.S. has the right to interfere in the governance of 
sovereign nations, such as Iraq, and establish a democracy.  Although the candidates 
disputed the tactics that would liberate Iraq and the Middle East from militant Islam, they 
shared the belief that Western ideology was essential to promoting national security 
abroad to protect America from terrorism.  The President’s and the Senator’s campaign 
rhetoric was bound to foreign policy objectives that ultimately, presented a debate 
favorable to U.S. hegemony, which informed “official” framing of the War on Terror. 
 According to media critics Robert McChesney and John Nichols, (2005), the U.S. 
press tends to look toward “official” sources to inform their news reports to frame the 
War on Terror in this country.  U.S. debate is restricted typically by the “consensus 
among “official” sources on the benign role of the United States in the world” 
(McChesney and Nichols 2005:44).  Since the candidates failed to provide a critical 
debate over the use of military of force or to dispute the consequences of American 
hegemony for oppressed peoples, George W. Bush and John Kerry were treated as the 
only two credible candidates by mainstream media.  During the 2004 Campaign, the 
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media did not set the margins of debate by addressing the candidates’ issues, as much as 
it set the margins of legitimate debate by reporting mostly on the candidates’ chances of 
winning.  They responded to the candidates’ personal characteristics framed by attack ads 
run by the opposing party that failed to provide a deeper analysis into their opponent’s 
platforms (McChesney and Nichols 2005).  The candidates constructed a narrow debate 
over the inherent moral righteousness of the U.S. War on Terror.  Because Senator Kerry, 
the opposition candidate, failed to challenge the credibility of the evidence put forth by 
the President in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, the media could not criticize either 
candidates without disrupting the status-quo.  Consequently, the press debated the 
accuracy of the tactics that the two candidates claimed would end the hostilities in Iraq 
and win the War on Terror, instead of debating whether the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq broke international treaties (McChesney and John Nichols 2005).  Therefore, 
challenges to presumptions about U.S. power over other nations were missing from 
mainstream media coverage of the campaign.  
 Douglas Kellner (2003), a professor of UCLA who examined the role of the 
media after September the 11th, made the point succinctly.  According to Kellner:  
Media events like party conventions and daily photo opportunities are 
concocted to project positive images of the candidates and to construct 
messages to sell the candidate to the public.  These events are 
supplemented by a full range of media advertising that often attempts both 
to project negative images of the opposition candidate and positive images 
for the presidential aspirant.  In an era of media spectacle, competing 
parties work hard to produce an attractive presidential “brand” that can be 
successfully marketed to the public (p. 107).   
 
 By examining the candidates’ rhetoric as opposed to simply looking at how the 
media portrayed the candidates, I was able to identify how they conceptualized the Iraq 
War and the broader War on Terror on the campaign trail for the White House in 2004 
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without the added ambiguity that viewing the election through media frames often 
creates.  Conversely, this is what makes it difficult for candidates who challenge the 
status-quo to receive meaningful mainstream media coverage.  Even when their 
campaigns are reported, these candidates often are not treated as serious competitors.   
Alternative “ways of seeing” war put forth by the social justice movement and anti-war 
voices were fostered by events surrounding the question of U.S. involvement in Iraq, like 
the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal,25 which frequently remained unaddressed by the 
mainstream media during the 2004 Election.  
Alternative frames that question the legitimacy of U.S. power abroad gain 
momentum when previous tactics used by the state to maintain and reinforce public 
support for war begin to fail.  Carl Boggs26 (2000) argues that “potentially explosive sites 
of conflict typical of advanced capitalism are likely to embrace…powerful elements of 
rebirth:  participatory democracy, a challenge to authoritarian rule, local community, 
linkage of the personal and the political, social forms of consumption, and so forth” (p. 
                                                 
 
 
25 Reporter Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker Magazine and 60 Minutes broke the story that abuse and 
torture of detainees was taking place at the U.S. prison in Iraq in early May of 2004.  Later, it was revealed 
that the US Army Criminal Investigation Command had been investigating the claims of abuse and torture 
since May 2003 when it published its findings in the Taguba Report in May 2004. 
26 Carl Boggs examines the diminishing civic space in The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the 
Decline of the Public Sphere.  He argues that the corporations have “colonized” our political system, our 
culture, and our daily experience in a country that is founded on a “limited democracy”, with little room for 
direct participation by citizens.  He emphasizes that the public space for citizens to participate in 
governmental decisions has been subsumed by corporate values, which do not emphasize social 
expenditures, but instead emphasize competition, individual rights, and freedom of opportunity.   
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254).  The social justice movement symbolized their opposition to President Bush’s 
framing of the Iraq War by establishing Camp Casey in honor of Cindy Sheehan’s son, 
who died fighting in Iraq, outside of the President’s ranch in Texas during the summer of 
2004.  Since that time, Sheehan announced at the Midwest Peace and Justice Summit on 
April 13, 2007 that she is spearheading a movement to launch a rehabilitation center at 
Camp Casey to help returning veterans heal from the psychological and spiritual wounds 
of combat in Iraq.27  Recent revelations of the deteriorating conditions found in Veteran 
Administration’s medical system,28 legitimates the idea of facilitating the recovery of 
veterans through grassroots organizing.   
Alternative frames gain credibility when the public perceives that the federal 
government fails to respond to public concerns responsibly and the story receives 
widespread press coverage.  The federal government’s inept, and seemingly callous 
response to Hurricane Katrina29 was heavily televised and popular mainstream media 
                                                 
 
 
27 The author of this study attended Cindy Sheehan’s speaking engagement at the Midwest Peace and 
Justice Summit held on the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis April 13-14, 2007. 
28
 See the February 20, 2007, Washington Post article, “Hospital Investigates Former Aid Chief: Walter 
Reed Official Had Own Charity,” for a report about the crisis within the Veteran Administration. 
29 In addition, the recovery effort was hampered by the instrumentalization and rationalization of 
bureaucracies, such as FEMA, whose mission was broadened to respond to national emergencies like 9/11, 
in addition to natural disasters.  Prior to the reorganization of FEMA under the Homeland Security 
Department, FEMA’s guiding principle was to respond to national disasters.  The reorganization of FEMA 
using the model of bureaucratic “streamlining” that has made the transfer of capital among multinationals 
profitable, has caused the national government to be ineffective in its re-building efforts after Katrina.   
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reporters like Anderson Cooper of CNN challenged the President’s management of the 
disaster.  Key to this criticism argued by members of the media was the limited 
availability of the National Guard to respond to this crisis.  Traditionally such forces have 
been largely dedicated to helping in national disasters.  However, since the President and 
his administration have relied heavily on this force to carry out missions in Iraq to fight 
the broader War on Terror, the Guard’s ability to respond became limited.  Not only was 
the Guard missing the needed numbers of service members to deal with the tragedy, 
much of their equipment that was needed to help them respond effectively to hurricane 
victims was in Iraq.  Because the government would not risk the mission in Iraq, it could 
not move the Guard’s equipment effectively to help Americans victimized by the 
hurricane. Uncontrollable events, like Hurricane Katrina, exposed the inefficiency and 
mismanagement of the Iraq War in a very palatable way to the public, thereby 
strengthening the criticisms made by the anti-war and social justice movement. 
According to Boggs, “sites of conflict” like the disputed relationship over allocation of 
resources to the management of domestic and foreign crises, aid the formation of local 
enclave movements and identity movements, such as the anti-war and social justice 
movement, by providing an access point for social movements to challenge government 
policy (2000).  “Sites of conflict” provide important points of rebirth for social 
movements to attack the institutional structures, which dominate political decision-
making (Boggs 2000).  Furthermore, dominant frames of understanding war become 
undermined when alternative constructions that frame U.S. foreign policy in opposition 
to freedom and peace gain traction.  Ultimately, the moral authority of the state is 
consensual.  If the public doubt the credibility of their leaders, then public opinion begins 
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to shift toward rejecting “official” interpretations of war.30  These alternative “ways of 
knowing” fill the gap left by the rejection of “official” explanations and thus provides an 
alternative version of 9/11 and the War on Terror, which opposes the ideology of 
American hegemony.   
The crisis of Hurricane Katrina was so shockingly exposed by government waste 
and inefficiency that it became a major news story that exposed the latent inequalities that 
are largely invisible and easily ignored otherwise.  This made it easier for grassroots 
social movements to challenge widely held assumptions about equality and opportunity 
that are bound up in the American Dream.  In addition, since the 2004 Election, the Iraq 
War has increasingly become unpopular among the American public who were promised 
a quick and inexpensive war by the President.  The 2006 Congressional Races were often 
won, even if by a slim margin, by candidates who promised to bring an end to American 
involvement in Iraq and were critical of the way the war was conducted.   
 This study not only suggests the existence of competing frames but it also 
suggests that the media aids “official” frames to marginalize competing ideas about 
democracy, because opposing ideas about war and peace challenge where the margins of 
debate are set by ‘“official”’ dialogue.  When crises are not effectively managed by 
government policy and U.S. leaders do not fulfill the commitments they have made to the 
                                                 
 
 
30  Kristen Breitweiser in her book, Wake-up Call: the Political Education a 9/11 Widow, recounts how 
Americans like herself who ordinarily would not align themselves with social justice and peace movement 
also come to dispute “official” framing of the War on Terror. 
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American public, political leaders’ moral authority and their ability to frame “official” 
debate can be challenged.   
 Because the findings of this study clarify how our political leaders set the margins 
of debate by excluding a broad range of opinion over important issues of national 
security, it is important that our discipline continues to deepen sociological understanding 
about “official” “ways of seeing” war.  Furthermore, in order to evaluate whether the 
political system in the United States is truly serving the interests of its people, research 
should be undertaken to not only aid public understanding, but to clarify the reasons that 
competing frames arise that contradict “official” “ways of seeing” war.  In addition, a 
closer examination of the relationship between the media and the policy makers in 
Washington would illuminate the process of how particular frames about important 
public policy come to dominate our understanding of the world.  A broader analysis of 
the conditions that lead to the rise of alternative frames that challenge “official” thinking 
about war would provide an opportunity to investigate why social change endures.  In 
addition, an analysis of social change would provide an opportunity to explore the 
conditions that impede or facilitate the possibility for social change, as well as evaluate 
the ability of social movements to influence public opinion and “official” policy 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES A1-A3 – DOCUMENTS BEFORE SAMPLING  
 
Table A1 – National Addresses of Candidates 
 
National Addresses 
 
Date Location 
Democratic Convention Nomination 
Speech 
July 29, 2004 
 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Republican Convention Nomination 
Speech 
September 2, 
2004 
New York City, New 
York 
Foreign Policy and Homeland Security 
Debate 
September 30, 
2004 
Coral Gables, Florida 
Concession Speech 
 
November 3, 
2004 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Re-election Acceptance Speech 
 
November 3, 
2004 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Table A2 – Speeches of Candidates in Elected Capacity 
 
Candidate 
  
Speech Name Date Location 
Bush  Proclaims Patriot Day September 10, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Kerry  Democratic National Radio Address  
 
September 11, 
2004 
Unknown 
Bush  President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi 
Press Conference 
September 23, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  Thanks Red Cross Schoolchildren for 
Helping Russian Terror Victims 
September 24, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  The President Discusses Iraq Report October 7, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  Presidential Radio Address 
 
October 9, 
2004 
Unknown 
Bush  Presidential Radio Address 2 
 
October 16, 
2004 
Unknown 
Kerry  Democratic National Radio Address:  
This Election Will Be in Your Hands 
October 30, 
2004 
Unknown 
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Table A3 – Rally Speeches of Candidates 
 
Candidate 
 
Issue  Date Location 
Kerry  Remarks at the Unity 2004 
Conference 
August 1, 
2004 
Washington, D.C. 
Kerry Speech to the Veterans of  Foreign  
Wars Annual Convention 
August 18, 
2004 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Kerry Speech to the International 
Association of Firefighters 
August 19, 
2004 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Kerry The Fundamental Choice August 24, 
2004 
New York City, 
New York 
Bush Remarks to Miami August 27, 
2004 
Miami, Florida 
Bush Remarks to the American Legion 
Convention 
August 31, 
2004 
Nashville, 
Tennessee 
Kerry  Remarks to the American Legion 
Convention 
September 1, 
2004 
Nashville, 
Tennessee 
Kerry  A New Course for America September 2, 
2004 
Springfield, Ohio 
Bush Victory 2004 Rally in Missouri September 6, 
2004 
Poplar Bluff, 
Missouri 
Kerry Remarks in Racine, West Virginia September 6, 
2004 
Racine, West 
Virginia 
Kerry Bush’s Wrong Choices in Iraq that 
Have Left Us Without Resources 
September 8, 
2004 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Kerry   Speech to the Congressional Black 
Caucus Legislative Conference 
September 11, 
2004 
Washington, D.C. 
Kerry  
 
Massachusetts 9/11 Fund: 
Third Anniversary Commemoration 
September 11, 
2004 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Kerry  Protecting America’s Seniors September 14, 
2004 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
Kerry Remarks to the National Guard 
Association of the United States  
September 16, 
2004 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
Bush Focus on Women’s Issues Event September 17, 
2004 
Charlotte, North 
Carolina 
Bush  Victory 2004 Rally in New York September 20, 
2004 
New York City, 
New York 
Kerry Speech at New York University September 20, 
2004 
New York City, 
New York 
Bush  Focus On Education Event September 22, 
2004 
King of Prussia, 
Pennsylvania 
Kerry  Speech at Temple University September 24, 
2004 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
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Candidate Issue 
 
Date Location 
Kerry A New Choice for Middle Class 
Families 
October 2, 
2004 
Orlando, Florida 
Kerry  Remarks at East Mt. Zion Baptist Church October 3, 
2004 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Bush  Goal to Stay on Offense for Promoting 
Peace and Security 
October 11, 
2004 
Hobbs, New 
Mexico 
Kerry  Energy Independence October 11, 
2004 
Santa Fe, New 
Mexico 
Bush  Emphasizes Importance of Funding for 
Our Troops 
October 16, 
2004 
Sunrise, Florida 
Kerry  Remarks at Xenia High School 
 
October 16, 
2004 
Xenia, Ohio 
Bush  Kicks Off Walk the Vote Weekend October 16, 
2004 
West Palm Beach, 
Florida 
Bush Fighting Terrorist Threat October 18, 
2004 
Marlton, New 
Jersey 
Kerry Health Care in America October 18, 
2004 
Tampa, Florida 
Kerry Choice of a Lifetime October 19, 
2004 
Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania 
Kerry A Fresh Start:  Succeeding In Iraq and 
Winning Against Terrorism 
October 20, 
2004 
Waterloo, Iowa 
Kerry  A Fresh Start Science and Innovation October 21, 
2004 
Columbus, 
Ohio 
Bush  Lays Out Election’s Five Key Choices 
Critical to Our Families and Our Future 
October 22, 
2004 
Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania 
Bush  Touts More Choices for Consumers as 
Means for Controlling Healthcare Costs 
October 22, 
2004 
Canton, Ohio 
Kerry A Fresh Start for Working Women October 22, 
2004 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Retirement Plans to Strengthen Benefits 
for Future Generations 
October 23, 
2004 
Ft. Myers, Florida 
Bush Proudly Running on His Record October 23, 
2004 
Lakeland, Florida 
Bush  Highlights His Reform and Results for 
America’s Hardworking Families 
October 23, 
2004 
Melbourne, Florida  
Bush Progress Depends of Safety of Our 
Citizens 
October 23, 
2004 
Jacksonville, 
Florida 
Kerry Speech at the Broward Center for the 
Performing Arts 
October 24, 
2004 
Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida 
Bush  New Term to Finish work of Promoting 
Democracy 
October 25, 
2004 
Greeley, Colorado 
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Candidate Issue Date Location 
 
Bush Whether Polls Up or Down, I’ll Always 
Support Military 
October 
25, 2004 
Council, Iowa 
Kerry Speech at University of Wisconsin at 
Green Bay 
October 
26, 2004 
Green Bay, 
Wisconsin 
Bush Outlining Five Clear Choices for Voters  October 
26, 2004 
Cuba City, 
Wisconsin 
Bush 
 
Touts Tax Relief for Getting Economy 
Going Again, Helping Small Business 
October 
26, 2004 
Richland Center, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Proud of His Record, Ready for Strong 
Victory on November 2nd 
October 
26, 2004 
Dubuque, Iowa 
Bush Coherent Vision, Taking Action, Keys 
to Leadership 
October 
27, 2004 
Onalaska, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Reaffirms Unwavering Commitment to 
Supporting Troops in Harm’s way 
October 
27, 2004 
Vienna, Ohio 
Bush  Looks to Continue Building Prosperity 
and Defending Our Values 
October 
27, 2004 
Findlay, Ohio 
Bush Focused on Day that is Coming October 
27, 2004 
Lititz, Pennsylvania 
Kerry Remarks at North High School October 
27, 2004 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Bush  Defends True Values of Our Families 
and Our Nation  
October 
28, 2004 
Saginaw, Michigan 
Bush Sets Path for Next Four Year  October 
28, 2004 
Dayton, Ohio 
Bush Republicans and Democrats for Strength 
and Purpose  
October 
28, 2004 
Yardley, 
Pennsylvania 
Bush  With Governor Schwarzenegger in Ohio 
America Is Back 
October 
29, 2004 
Columbus, Ohio 
Bush Pays Tribute to Family Members of 
9/11 Victims 
October 
29, 2004 
Manchester, New 
Hampshire 
Bush As Election Day Nears Urges Ohioans 
to Keep Up the Great Work 
October 
29, 2004 
Toledo, Ohio 
Bush Tough Strategies to Combat Threat 
Unlike Any We Have Faced 
October 
29, 2004 
Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire 
Kerry  Four Days to Change America 
 
October 
29, 2004 
Orlando, Florida 
Bush Touts Vision That Spreads Prosperity to 
Every Corner of America 
October 
30, 2004 
Grand Rapids, 
Michigan 
Bush Progress Depends on Safety of 
American People 
October 
30, 2004 
Ashwaubenon, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Rallies Floridians for Final 48 Hour Get 
Out the Vote 
October 
31, 2004 
Tampa, Florida 
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Candidate 
 
Issue Date Location 
Bush Rallies Diverse Group of Supporters to 
Stand for Steady, Strong Leadership 
October 31, 
2004 
Coconut Grove,  
Florida 
Bush America’s Future Safety and 
Prosperity on the Ballot 
October 31, 
2004 
Gainesville, Florid 
Bush  Promotes Unwavering Confident 
Leadership 
October 31, 
2004 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Bush Carries Pre-Election Day Momentum 
into Ohio Says Choice 
November 1, 
2004 
Wilmington, Ohio 
Bush  Excited and Optimistic as He Lays Out 
Vision for Days Ahead  
November 1, 
2004 
Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 
Bush  Motivates Iowans During Campaign 
Sprint to the Victory Finish 
November 1, 
2004 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Bush Remind Voters to go to the Polls  November 1, 
2004 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
Bush Just Hours from Casting First Iowa 
Ballots Supporters Join President 
November 1, 
2004 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Bush With Your Help I’ll Carry Honor and 
Dignity of Presidency  
November 1, 
2004 
Albuquerque, New 
Mexico 
Bush On Final Lap to Victory Stops in 
Dallas to Rally the Vote 
November 2, 
2004 
Dallas, Texas 
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APPENDIX B  
 
TABLES B1-B3 – DOCUMENTS IN SAMPLE  
 
Table B1 – National Addresses of Candidates 
 
National Addresses 
 
Date Location 
Democratic Convention Nomination 
Speech 
July 29, 2004 
 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Republican Convention Nomination 
Speech 
September 2, 2004 New York City, New 
York 
Foreign Policy and Homeland Security 
Debate 
September 30, 
2004 
Coral Gables, Florida 
Concession Speech 
 
November 3, 2004 Boston, Massachusetts 
Re-election Acceptance Speech 
 
November 3, 2004 Washington, D.C. 
 
Table B2 – Speeches of Candidates in Elected Capacity 
 
Candidate 
  
Speech Name Date Location 
Bush  Proclaims Patriot Day September 10, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Kerry  Democratic National Radio Address  
 
September 11, 
2004 
Unknown 
Bush  President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi 
Press Conference 
September 23, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  Thanks Red Cross Schoolchildren for 
Helping Russian Terror Victims 
September 24, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  The President Discusses Iraq Report October 7, 
2004 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Bush  Presidential Radio Address 
 
October 9, 
2004 
Unknown 
Bush  Presidential Radio Address 2 
 
October 16, 
2004 
Unknown 
Kerry  Democratic National Radio Address:  
This Election Will Be in Your Hands 
October 30, 
2004 
Unknown 
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Table B3 – Rally Speeches of Candidates 
 
Candidate 
 
Issue Date Location 
Kerry  Remarks at the Unity 2004 Conference 
 
August 1, 
2004 
Washington, D.C. 
Kerry  Remarks to the American Legion 
Convention 
September 1, 
2004 
Nashville, 
Tennessee 
Kerry  A New Course for America September 2, 
2004 
Springfield, Ohio 
Kerry   Speech to the Congressional Black 
Caucus Legislative Conference 
September 
11, 2004 
Washington, D.C. 
Kerry  
 
Massachusetts 9/11 Fund: 
Third Anniversary Commemoration 
September 
11, 2004 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Kerry  Health Care and America’s Seniors September 
14, 2004 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Victory 2004 Rally in New York September 
20, 2004 
New York City, 
New York 
Bush  Focus On Education Event September 
22, 2004 
King of Prussia, 
Pennsylvania 
Kerry  Speech at Temple University September 
24, 2004 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
Kerry  A New Choice for Middle Class 
Families 
October 2, 
2004 
Orlando, Florida 
Kerry  Remarks at East Mt. Zion Baptist 
Church 
October 3, 
2004 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Bush  Goal to Stay on Offense for Promoting 
Peace and Security 
October 11, 
2004 
Hobbs, New 
Mexico 
Kerry  Energy Independence October 11, 
2004 
Santa Fe, New 
Mexico 
Bush  Emphasizes Importance of Funding for 
Our Troops 
October 16, 
2004 
Sunrise, Florida 
Kerry  Remarks at Xenia High School 
 
October 16, 
2004 
Xenia, Ohio 
Bush  Kicks Off Walk the Vote Weekend October 16, 
2004 
West Palm Beach, 
Florida 
Kerry  A Fresh Start Science and Innovation October 21, 
2004 
Columbus, 
Ohio 
Bush  Lays Out Election’s Five Key Choices 
Critical to Our Families and Our 
Future 
October 22, 
2004 
Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania 
Bush  Touts More Choices for Consumers as 
Means for Controlling Healthcare 
Costs 
October 22, 
2004 
Canton, Ohio 
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Candidate Issue Date Location 
 
Bush Retirement Plans to Strengthen Benefits 
for Future Generations 
October 23, 
2004 
Ft. Myers, 
Florida 
Bush  Highlights His Reform and Results for 
America’s Hardworking Families 
October 23, 
2004 
Melbourne, 
Florida  
Bush  New Term to Finish work of Promoting 
Democracy 
October 25, 
2004 
Greeley, 
Colorado 
Bush  Whether Polls Up or Down, I’ll Always 
Support Military 
October 25, 
2004 
Council ,Iowa 
Bush 
 
Touts Tax Relief for Getting Economy 
Going Again, Helping Small Business 
October 26, 
2004 
Richland 
Center, 
Wisconsin 
Bush  Proud of His Record, Ready for Strong 
Victory on November 2nd, Tuesday 
October 26, 
2004 
Dubuque, Iowa 
Bush  Reaffirms Unwavering Commitment to 
Supporting Troops in Harm’s way 
October 27, 
2004 
Vienna, Ohio 
Bush  Looks to Continue Building Prosperity 
and Defending Our Values 
October 27, 
2004 
Findlay, Ohio 
Bush  Defends True Values of Our Families and 
Our Nation  
October 28, 
2004 
Saginaw, 
Michigan 
Bush  With Governor Schwarzenegger in Ohio 
America Is Back 
October 29, 
2004 
Columbus, 
Ohio 
Kerry  Four Days to Change America 
 
October 29, 
2004 
Orlando, 
Florida 
Bush  Rallies Floridians for Final 48 Hour Get 
Out the Vote 
October 31, 
2004 
Tampa, Florida 
Bush  Rallies Diverse Group of Supporters to 
Stand for Steady, Strong Leadership 
October 31, 
2004 
Coconut Grove,  
Florida 
Bush  Promotes Unwavering Confident 
Leadership 
October 31, 
2004 
Cincinnati, 
Ohio 
Bush  Excited and Optimistic as He Lays Out 
Vision for Days Ahead  
November 1, 
2004 
Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 
Bush  Motivates Iowans During Campaign 
Sprint to the Victory Finish 
November 1, 
2004 
Des Moines, 
Iowa 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TABLES C1-C3 – THEMES  
 
Table C1 – Coding Index of Preliminary Themes  
 
Preliminary Theme Summary 
 
Retelling 9/11 restating and offering explanations for the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 to give meaning to the loss of American lives  
Victimizing 
citizens 
Americans who died or who were injured in attacks on the World 
Trade Centers (WTC) in New York City (NYC) on September 11, 
2001 
Saving citizens first responders and others who saved the lives of survivors during 
and after the attacks on the WTC in NYC, at the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C.; and the passengers on United Flight 93 whose 
plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania in their attempt to 
prevent a terrorist attack on the White House on September 11, 
2001 
Responding to 
9/11 
U.S. responds to the terrorist threat with the War on Terror to 
prevent another direct attack on the homeland and fight terrorism 
abroad by democratizing the Middle East. 
Storytelling romanticizing American history to promote an altruistic view of 
war 
Hero Making the bravery and heroic efforts of first responders and others to save 
fellow citizens on 9/11 indicate national character and symbolize 
what it means to be an “American” 
Liberating descriptions of the U.S. freeing Iraqis from terrorism and tyranny to 
enjoy democracy  
Trusting in the 
Faith and Spirit of 
America 
conviction in the principles the nation embodies—freedom, liberty, 
and justice  
Proclaiming the 
Future of America 
predicting America and Iraq will be free from terrorism after the 
War on Terror is won 
Defining the 
President’s Role 
the candidates define the duties of a wartime presidency 
Characterizing 
U.S. Soldiers 
depicting the character of U.S. service members fighting the Iraq 
War 
Characterizing Our 
Enemies 
nations, groups, and individuals who oppose the Iraq War and the 
War on Terror and who are hostile to U.S. interests abroad 
Characterizing Our 
Allies 
nations who joined the U.S. coalition in Iraq and who are friendly 
to U.S. interests abroad 
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C2 –Taxonomy of Final Themes, Sub-themes, and Summary of Debate 
 
Final Theme and 
Sub-theme(s) 
Dimensions of Themes  
  
Responding to 
9/11  
defined the War on Terror; disputed the link between 9/11 and the  
Iraq War; connected the democratization of the Middle East to U.S. 
security 
disputed theme  
Bush 
 
Iraq was a terrorist threat prior to invasion 
Kerry 
 
Iraq was a terrorist threat because of an extended U.S. occupation 
  
retelling 9/11 accounting of 9/11; introduced the debate that framed foreign 
policy response to 9/11; linked the events of 9/11 either directly or 
indirectly to the War on Terror; i.e., commonly referred to the loss 
of life on September the 11th that the World Trade Center with the 
number 3,000 when they described the War on Terror (the sub-
themes victimizing citizens and saving citizens were collapsed into 
this category, see Table C1) 
disputed theme  
Bush linked 9/11 to Saddam Hussein to explain his decision to invade 
Iraq; argued that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s potential ability to 
spread nuclear technology to terrorist organizations, to finance their 
operations, and to give them protection from the U.S. would 
increase the risk of another ‘9/11 like’ attack occurring 
Kerry disputed the President’s analysis that Iraq was a terrorist threat and 
the invasion of Iraq was necessary to avoid another terrorist attack; 
not only had invasion created a terrorist threat from Iraq, but it had 
diverted the U.S. from capturing Osama Bin Laden and fighting the 
‘real’ War on Terror in Afghanistan 
  
our enemies described who is responsible for 9/11 and who is a threat to national 
security; depicted an enemy who fears freedom and democracy; 
compared the threat of terrorism to past threats; i.e., democracy 
versus Communism, democracy versus militant Islam 
disputed theme  
Bush labeled Saddam Hussein as an enemy and associate of Al-Qaeda; 
labeled Osama bin Laden as an enemy 
Kerry labeled Saddam Hussein as an enemy of the Iraqi people, but not 
Americans; Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are the ‘real’ enemy  
  
our allies reserved the right to implement a pre-emptive strike; disputed 
strategies to build coalitions with other nations to fight terrorism 
and the conditions to be met before a pre-emptive strike is launched 
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Final Theme and 
Sub-theme(s) 
Dimensions of Theme 
disputed theme  
Bush Questioned the Senator’s tactic of passing a “global test” with our 
allies and other nations before launching a pre-emptive strike at 
another nation; disputed whether the Senator would prioritize the 
national security interests of the U.S. over “rogue” nations 
Kerry Questioned whether the President followed the mandates of the 
U.N. prior to the invasion of Iraq; disputed the President’s ability to 
build credibility with our allies and global community 
  
Learning from 
Prior Wars 
defined the historical role of U.S. military might in world affairs; 
interpreted WWII; i.e., compared Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
compared WWII to the War on Terror;  
disputed theme  
Bush 
 
bringing peace through democratization of the enemy;  
i.e., compared President Truman’s democratization of Japan to the 
democratization of Iraq 
Kerry restoring the nation’s reputation abroad to promote peace;  
i.e. Iraq War policy symbolizes failed domestic and foreign policies 
unlike President Franklin Roosevelt’s war policies that led to the 
development of new technology, expanded the labor market, and 
advanced the nation’s reputation 
  
arguing over the 
Vietnam 
Syndrome 
disputed the success of the President’s Iraq War policy in 
combating terrorism  
disputed theme  
Bush steadfastness in pursuing victory in Iraq was essential to protect the 
freedom of Americans and protect the Iraq’s fragile democracy; 
important to honor America’s commitment to Iraq 
Kerry Vietnam should have taught the nation’s foreign policy leaders to 
choose their battlefields more wisely and avoid ideologically 
ambiguous commitments of American military strength 
  
arguing over 
previous wartime 
presidents 
compared their war strategies and their opponent’s war strategy to 
former presidents’ war strategies to reinforce the urgency of 
principled leadership during war 
disputed theme  
Bush reviewed Senator Kerry’s record of opposition to former 
Presidents’ Reagan and Clinton foreign policy decisions on the 
Middle East, the Cold War, and military expenditures and 
questioned the Senator’s loyalty to the values and goals symbolized 
by noteworthy Democratic leaders, like Senator Ted Kennedy 
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Final Theme and 
Sub-theme(s) 
Dimensions of Theme 
Kerry contrasted the President Bush’s ability to build alliances with the 
success his father, the first President Bush, had at coalition building 
during the Gulf War; as well as President Clinton, who relied on 
NATO forces to manage the fall-out from the Soviet collapse in 
Eastern Europe; and questioned the President’s credibility with 
world leaders to fight terrorism to President Kennedy’s handling of 
the Communist threat during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
  
Contesting Images 
of Patriotism 
used symbolism to exhibit patriotic sentiment that engages the 
nation more during wartime than during peacetime to question their 
opponent’s ability to win the War on Terror; i.e., the will of God; 
agreed that establishing a democracy in Iraq and the greater Middle 
East and supporting the troops in combat was essential to ending 
hostilities in Iraq and to winning the War on Terror; only disputed 
the tactics that would accomplish mutually shared objectives 
disputed theme  
Bush images of God’s will; i.e., proclaimed that freedom was not 
America’s gift to the world, but God’s gift to the world; pledged to 
commit all resources needed to bring victory in order to 
democratize Iraq and the broader Middle East since winning the 
Iraq War was central to combating terrorism and ultimately winning 
the War on Terror 
Kerry images of God’s will; i.e., hoped that rather than God being on the 
side of the U.S., that the U.S. was on the side of God; the war in 
Iraq was viewed as a diversion from the ‘real’ War on Terror that 
overextended the military and domestic budgets and exacerbated 
terrorist hatred for an American occupation; believed with the right 
leadership that hostilities in Iraq could be ended by simultaneously 
assembling a broad international coalition to support military 
operations while engaging the Middle East in a serious debate about 
democracy and the liberty that it would bring to the oppressed 
 
TABLE C3 – Themes Found in Prior Studies 
 
Theme 
 
Definition 
Calling to Arms “convincing people, en masse, to kill and die on behalf of some 
cause or other” (Graham, Keenan and Dowd 2004: 200) 
Presenting 
Violence Publicly 
“preparing the ground for future violence” (Leuder and Marshland 
2002: 244) 
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Theme 
 
Definition 
Creating 
Honorable and 
Dishonorable 
Images 
“craft[ing] the authority to dominate public interpretation of . . . 
events and the appropriate response to them” (Murphy 2003: 606) 
Vilifying the 
Enemy 
“consistently constructing Arabs as terrorists” to justify acts of 
violence based on socially sanctioned prejudice (Merskin 2004: 
172) 
Creating Binaries “the placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite,” 
such as good versus evil (Coe, Domke, Graham, Lockett John, and 
Pickard 2004: 403) 
Creating Targets of 
Violence and 
Protection 
a directive that establishes whose lives are targeted for killing and 
whose lives are targeted for protection (Butt, Lukin, Matthiessen 
2004) 
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